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Abstract
The act of terrorism is not a new form of deviance or bravado. Yet since 9/11,
it has been treated as a form of 'war' rather than as 'crime'. This distinction has
served to legitimize terrorist organizations objectives, weaken the rule of law,
converge the military and traditional criminal justice system models in adjudicating terrorists, and call into question the reach humanitarian law has in this convergence. This article examines the development of indefinite detention as it has
been used in the 'War on Terror' and argues that the American criminal justice
system holds the key to resolving many of these aforementioned issues. Thus, a
divergence of military and criminal justice models is necessary if we are to preserve constitutional safeguards and exemplify both a strong and unified response
to terrorism, while simultaneously exhibiting the standards of an evolving society
under the paradigm of Just War.
I.

Introduction

A discernible problem with the War on Terror, other than its amorphous definition, is how to impose justice upon those who are committing these acts of
terror. The transition from the enemy being the 'nation-state' to the unidentified
arbiter of terror has created a legal conundrum concerning what must be done
with these individuals once captured by our nation's armed forces and law enforcement. Since 9/11 and the use of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base as the predetermined residence for many unlawful enemy combatants, we have incrementally
solved several of the legal problems regarding their confinement and constitutional rights. This includes: extraterritoriality questions,' the right to habeas
corpus petitions, 2 and the legality of detention of enemy combatants. 3 Following
landmark Supreme Court decisions Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v.

Bush, the Obama Administration responded by promoting legislation that seeks
to curb the individual due process rights of detained enemy combatants.4 Furthermore, there is a 'tug-of-war' that is occurring between the executive and judicial
branches. When the former restricts the rights endowed to detainees, the latter
concedes alternative routes to previously embargoed liberties. 5 In light of each
I See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
2 Id.
3 Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 670 (2006).
4 Boumediene, 533 U.S. 723 at 739. ("If this ongoing dialogue between and among the branches of
Government is to be respected, we cannot ignore that the MCA was a direct response to Hamdan's
holding that the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provision had no application to pending cases. The Court of
Appeals was correct to take note of the legislative history when construing the statute." The Supreme
Court also cited relevant floor statements and agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the
MCA deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus actions now before us.").
5 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that a U.S. citizen being held as an "enemy
combatant" had the same procedural due process rights as lawful citizens in that they were entitled to the
opportunity to refute such accusations before a rightful authority. Detainees had a right to challenge the
legality of their detention via 28 U.S.C. §2241, at the federal district court in Washington D.C.); see also

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 466-67 (2004) (explaining that in 2005, The DoD established Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) where detainees are allowed to defend themselves against their reason
for detention. Later that year, the DoD enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, which prevented them from
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branch's differing opinions on the efficacy of indefinite detention, it is important
to understand the basic controversies that lie at the root of the War on Terror.
Collectively, they can most aptly be described as:
the international legality of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq; our
indefinite detention of so-called "enemy combatants" at Guantanamo and
perhaps other secret locations; our use of cruel, inhumane and degrading
interrogation methods at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere; our "extraordinary
rendition" of alleged terrorists to countries that we know engage in torture; our arrest and sentencing to death of aliens without having informed
their consulates as required by the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.6
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether indefinite detention is a viable, practical and ethical form of incarceration within the paradigm of the War on
Terror as compared to traditional criminal justice modes of adjudication. This
article argues that while both the criminal justice and military models each have
their respective benefits, the former posits the least long-term concerns and costs,
and by solely using the criminal justice model to adjudicate terrorists, we can
increase the strength of the rule of law, see the incorporation of international
humanitarian law into domestic courts, and witness a divergence of military and
criminal procedure.
While significant review of detainee due process has been evident, the question regarding the viability and legality of indefinite detention has not been fully
answered. Moreover, the Obama administration plans to counter the Bush administration's policy on indefinite detention. 7 Nations around the world decide how
to adjudicate terrorists in different ways. Their various responses have yet to
depict a clear cut set of procedural safeguards in accordance with the laws of
war,8 which will be discussed in depth in section III.
seeking habeas corpus relief in federal courts, but allowed them to seek further review of their CSRT
determinations in the D.C. Circuit. In Hamdan the Supreme Court held that the use of military commissions were invalid because they violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Congress then passed the Military Commissions Act in 2006 baring
the application to federal courts by detainees seeking habeas corpus relief. In 2008, the Supreme Court
ruled in Boumediene that the suspension of the writ was unconstitutional and that all detainees had access
to Article III courts for habeas relief. Congress then passed the Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention and Prosecution Act of 2010, S. 3081 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 (NDAA), Public Law 112-81. The former seeks to curb the Department of Justice's involvement in
prosecuting terrorists in Article III courts, while the latter allows for the indefinite detention of suspected
terrorists, namely alien unlawful enemy combatants. See also Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, at
1108-1119 (explaining the procedures of the current military model).
6 Richard B. Bilder, On Being an International Lawyer, 3 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 135, 135
(2007).
7 See Lolita C. Baldor, Obama Restarts Guantanamo Trials After Two-year Ban, Salon.com (Mar. 7,
2011) http://www.salon.com/2011/03/07/obama-restartsguantanamo-trials/.

8 Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1092 ("The variability of these frameworks ... belies any
claim that a specific set of procedural safeguards is mandated by the customary laws of war. Indeed, it
would be difficult to show that any particular set of procedures used in actual practice reflects opinion
juris rather than practical or political expediency.").
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II.

Development of Current Legislation

Following the September 11 attacks, Congress expeditiously constructed the
USA PATRIOT Act to hasten the search and seizure and, when warranted, execution of unlawful enemy belligerents that were responsible for the attacks. This
piece of legislation also served as the gateway for what many Americans feel has
evolved into an abusive use of power with regards to the surveillance and intelligence community. Irrespective of the specific sections of the act, the prime focus
of this legislation, in accordance with the newly mandated Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF), was to bring to justice those responsible for the hostilities against the United States on 9/11 and to protect America from future attacks from these organizations, persons or nations.9 The President has the
authority to use any means necessary to enforce these motivations. However, the
PATRIOT Act has been scrutinized for its authorization to indefinitely detain
suspected and 'certified' alien terrorists. Nonetheless, several questions remain
regarding the legal means the President can use to see that our nation's objective
goals come to fruition. More importantly, the question remains whether the President can 'indefinitely detain' suspected or confirmed enemy combatants. What
measures has the government taken to ensure that 'indefinite detention' does not
mean 'forever', and how is this not a violation of due process? How does 'indefinite detention' comport with International Humanitarian Law, namely the Geneva Conventions? Lastly, is 'indefinitely detention' a viable, albeit legal route in
adjudicating the War on Terror? This section seeks to examine these aforementioned questions and in doing so, will examine the legislation and legal reasoning
that the executive feels they are justified in using.
A.

Government Restriction?

1.

Stripping the Courts

As of May 2014, there are 149 detainees' 0 being held at Guantanamo Naval
Base, despite close to 779 detainees having stayed there at some point since
2002.11 Current rationales for detaining enemy combatants are as follows:
(1) persons [are] placed in non-penal, preventative detention to stop them
from rejoining hostilities; (2) persons who have been brought, or are expected to be brought, before a military tribunal to face criminal charges
for alleged war crimes; and (3) persons who have been cleared for trans9 See Authorization for Use of Military Force Act of 2001 [hereinafter AUMF], Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224.
10 See Fox News, US soldier held captive by Taliban in Afghanistan for nearly five years freed, May
31, 2014, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/05/31/wh-us-solider-held-in-afghanistanbergdahl-is-released-after-five-years/ ("There are now 149 detainees remaining at Guantanamo Bay.").
II See The New York Times, The Guantanamo Docket, available at http://projects.nytimes.com/
guantanamo (last visited February 15, 2015).
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fer or release to a third country, whom the United States continues to
detain pending transfer. 12
While significant literature exists on the jurisdiction question (whether Article III
courts have the authorization to hear habeas corpus petitions of detainees), 13 the
legality of our mode of indefinite detention is unclear. What is clear, however, is
that the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
201214 limited the Executive's ability to only detain unlawful aliens captures
outside of the United States.' 5 The Executive refuses to entitle individuals we
capture during hostilities as 'prisoners of war' (POW), and instead uses the term
'unlawful enemy combatant;' a term not explicitly defined within international
humanitarian law (IHL). This enables the Executive to determine the treatment of
unlawful enemy combatants without an explicitly mandated rubric. This changed
slightly when the Obama administration redefined those being detained as 'unprivileged belligerent(s)' in order to make the system more party to IHL. 1 6 This
was done to preclude the notion that we were in a declared war and to abstain
from conceding international humanitarian rights to non-state actors- despite the
fact that over the past decade, non-state actors have been achieving gradual forms
of legal personality.' 7
Furthermore, repeated efforts to "strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
challenges by detainees [was] a key part of this strategy" by the executive.' 8 In
each case, the executive's objective was to minimize the legal constraints on
executive action, to confine decision making within the executive branch, and to
avoid the procedural and substantive protections.' 9 One of the first attempts of
the executive to accomplish this objective was restricting the ability of article III
courts to hear or even have jurisdiction over such cases. The Court in
Boumediene relied on the Insular cases to determine the 'de facto' sovereignty
that the United States exercises over Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 20 In doing so, the
12 Michael John Garcia et al., Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues, Cong. Research Serv. R40139, (2009), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40139_20090115.pdf; see also
NDAA, supra note 5.
13 See sources cited supra note 5; see also Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679 (2008) ("Federal
district courts.. may not exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin the United States from transferring
individuals alleged to have committed crimes and detained within the territory of a foreign sovereign to
that sovereign for criminal prosecution."). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(1) (West 2008)).
14 NDAA, supra note 5 at § 1021; 10 U.S.C.A. § 801 (2006).
15 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170,. 173 (2d Cir. 2013).
16 See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, Global War on TerrorIs Given New Name, WASH. PosT (Mar. 25,
2009) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR20090324028
18.html. But cf. John Floyd & Billy Sinclair, Is Osama bin Laden a Terroristor an Unprivileged Belligerent? JOHN T. Foyi: CRIM. JURISDICTION: ARncuIs ON CRIMINAL LAW (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www

.johntfloyd.com/blog/is-osama-bin-laden-a-terrorist-or-an-unpri vileged-belligerent.
17 Wilson, supra note 16.
18 Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. RaV. 551, 553
(2013).
'9 Id.

20 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758-59 (2008); see also Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S.
298, 312 (1922) ("The Constitution of the United States is in force in Porto Rico as it is wherever and
whenever the sovereign power of that government is exerted. This has not only been admitted, but em-
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Court structured an avenue for future habeas petitions to be heard and questions
of jurisdiction quelled. More specifically, the Court construed the applicability of
the Suspension Clause in Boumediene. Despite the lack of territorial sovereignty,
Guantanamo Bay remained under 'effective control' by the United States. 2 1 The
Court also addresses this in Dorr v. United States (1904):
In every case where Congress undertakes to legislate in the exercise of the
power conferred by the Constitution, the question may arise as to how far
the exercise of the power is limited by the 'prohibitions' of that instrument. The limitations which are to be applied in any given case involving
territorial government must depend upon the relation of the particular territory to the United States, concerning which Congress is exercising the
power conferred by the Constitution. 22
Limiting the Reach of InternationalLaw

2.

Subsequently, invoking Common Article III of the Geneva Convention instead
of Convention IV bridged the gap between IHL and U.S. law. 2 3 The Court subjected the entire War on Terror, not just action in Afghanistan, to the limitations
of IHL. 2 4 When President Obama took office, he not only declared that Common
Article III of the Geneva Convention was the 'minimum baseline' 25 with regards
to treatment of detainees, but also that if it was feasible to do so, detainees would
be prosecuted in Article III courts. 2 6 This would temporarily halt the use of military commissions. 2 7 Also, despite the passing of the Detainee Treatment Act
(2005), the Military Commissions Act of 2006 failed to set forth adequate procedures and standards for future use. 28 Since 9/11, the detention policy allowed
phasized, by this court in all its authoritative expressions upon the issues arising in the Insular Cases,
especially in the Downes v. Bidwell and the Door Cases. The Constitution, however, contains grants of
power, and limitations which in the nature of things are not always and everywhere applicable and the
real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Puerto
Rico when we went there, but which ones of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon the
exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new conditions and requirements."); see
generally Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
21 Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rinv. 1, 15-34 (2004).
22 Fred L. Doff v. US, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 288
(1901).
23 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 670 (2006).
24 Id.; see generally Eric Heize, The Evolution of InternationalLaw in Light of the 'Global War on
Terror, 37 REv. INT'L SruD., 1069 (2011).
25 Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 22, 2009) ("Common Article 3
Standards as a Minimum Baseline. Consistent with the requirements of the Federal torture statute, 18
U.S.C. 2340-2340A, section 1003 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. 2000dd, the Convention Against Torture, Common Article 3, and other laws regulating the treatment and interrogation of
individuals detained in any armed conflict.").
26 Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained At the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure
of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4899 (Jan. 22, 2009).
27 Id.

28 See generally Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. (2006)
[hereinafter MCA]; see also Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (regarding the Detainee Treatment Act).
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criminal trials, military commissions, and indefinite military detention to adjudicate the War on Terror. 2 9
The government also amended the War Crimes Act in redefining the scope of
what constitutes violations of common Article IH1 of the Geneva Conventions 30 :
The provisions of section 2441 of title 18, United States Code, as
amended by this section, fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of
the Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effective
penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in common
Article 3 in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character. No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a
rule of decision in the courts of the United States in interpreting the
prohibitions enumerated in subsection (d) of such section 2441.31
Also, it limits the reach of the Conventions themselves into habeas proceedings:
No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto
in any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the
United States, or a current or former officer, employee, member of the
Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as a source of
32
rights in any court of the United States or its States or territories.
The MCA holds that "the President has the authority for the United States to
interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions." 33
A chief concern of the PATRIOT Act and subsequent legislation is that its
overarching structure and scope abridges individual rights, mainly the right to
privacy. The argument that its broad scope undermines some individual protections for the greater good of society is beyond the purpose of this piece. Nonetheless, Lewis Dunn sheds some prophetic light on what might evolve from the
threat of terrorism:
At least some of the measures required to deal with the threats of clandestine nuclear attack . . . will be in tension with or in outright violation of
the civil liberties procedures and underlying values of Western liberal democracies. Because of the stakes, there will be strong pressures to circumvent or set aside-in the United States and elsewhere- various
constitutional and legal restrictions on invasions of privacy or other traditional civil liberties. . .. The use of warrantless or illegal wiretaps, and the
secret detentions and questioning of suspects for days or even weeks
might follow, all motivated by the need to acquire information as fast as
29 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1080.
30 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva
Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 322 (2007).
31 MCA, supra note 28, at 6(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
32 MCA, supra note 28, at 5(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
33 MCA, supra note 28, at 6(a)(3)(A).
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possible. . . . Within the United States, both rigorous administrative supervision of any emergency measures and strict judicial review after the
fact would help prevent those measures from spilling over their boundaries and corrupting procedures in other areas of law enforcement.... But
if the frequency of proliferation-related threats grows, and if violations of
traditional civil liberties cease to be isolated occurrences, it will become
more difficult to check this corrosion of liberal democracy here and
elsewhere. 34
Even though Dunn's focus is nuclear proliferation and the threats that nonstate actors pose to Western democracies, that threat was and is still a viable one,
hence the invasion of Iraq, focus on WMDs following 9/11, and other preventive
measures taken by other nations in the War on Terror. Nonetheless, despite the
immeasurable costs we would suffer if WMD's were employed by a terrorist
organization, terrorists acquire and use such weapons. 3 5 The important take-away
is how government responses to terrorism may lead to acerbic curtailment of
individual liberties in a utilitarian framework that posits national security and
defense above individual freedom. The sacrifice of individual liberties may be
necessary, to an extent. In sum, the courts will serve as the balancing test for this
challenge.3 6
B.

Expansion of Powers

1.

Are the President'sPowers 'Sweeping'?

The world has witnessed a 'closing of the gap' between the law of non-international armed conflicts and international armed conflicts. 3 7 The law of war
"does indeed provide for detention without charge of both prisoners of war and
civilians in certain circumstances; however, the question here is whether the 'indefinite detention currently at issue can truly be called 'law of war' detention."38
Within the paradigm of an international armed conflict, the detention powers of
the state are 'sweeping.' 39 However, the Hamdan court ruled that despite the
34 Lewis Dunn, What Difference Will it Make?, in THE UsE oF- FORCE: INTERNATIONAIL POILr1ICS AND
FOREIGN Poucy 525-526 (Art and Waltz, 1993).
35 See Gary LaFree et al., The Interplay between Terrorism, Nonstate Actors, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: An Exploration of the Pinkerton Database, 7 INT'L Srun. Riv. 155, 156 (2005) ("Incidents
involving these weapons remain a rare occurrence. In fact, only forty-one of the 69,000 cases in our
database used such weapons. Most involved long-range missiles capable of carrying warheads; chemical
attacks typically included the use of mercury, acid, napalm, cyanide (found in water supplies), and chemical bombs, often intended to disrupt the targeted nation's economy.").
36 See Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("The high stakes here pressing
the scales thus compel the Court to strike the most sensitive judicial balance, calibrating by delicate
increments toward a result that adequately protects national security without unduly sacrificing individual
freedoms, that endeavors to do what is just for one and right for all.").
37 Marco Sass6li & Marie-Louise Tougas, International Law Issues Raised by the Transfer of Detainees by Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, 56 McGILL. L. J. 959, 969-970 (2011).
38 Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63
RUTGERs L. Ruv. 1169, 1170 (2011).
39 Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the
Other War, 51 VA. J. INT'l L. 549, 560 (2011).
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President's powers to create such Commissions to determine the detention and
prosecution of unlawful belligerents, his power is not 'sweeping.' 4 0 The court
made reference to the laws of war through the sublime invocation of section 821
of the U.C.M.J., namely mandating compliance with common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. 4 1 Article 3 addresses the prevention of the "passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 4 2 Nonetheless, in
Boumediene, the Court maintained that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus rights. The MCA was a prime example of government
intention to mold constitutional limits into what best served the 'War on Terror.'
Furthermore, history has shown us that:
constitutional limits have flexed not merely to protect the public but also
to advance new ambitions and interests.

. .

. In the twentieth century, the

Supreme Court rarely got in the way of the exercise of executive power in
wartime,

. . .

[but] since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court

has refused to rubber-stamp Executive Branch security programs in the
"war" against global terrorism. . . . [T]he Court has also declined to take
steps that bind the Executive and Congress all that tightly in their exercise
of foreign affairs powers.4 3
Nonetheless, the Court has chosen not to fully bind the remaining branches'
exercise of foreign affairs. 4 4 Despite further developments in the due process
rights available to detainees, Congress continues to limit the fruition of these
rights via subsequent legislation 45 that mandates the detention of alien enemy
combatants. 4 6 The overall scope and purpose of detention, pursuant to both the
AUMF and PATRIOT Act, should be to detain enemy combatants who are responsible for attacks previously conducted against the United States and those
40 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006) ("Contrary to the Government's assertion,
however, even Quirin did not view the authorization as a sweeping mandate for the President to invoke
military commissions when he deems them necessary."); id. at 594 ("The Government would have us
dispense with the inquiry that the Quirin Court undertook and find in either the AUMF or the DTA
specific, overriding authorization for the very commission that has been convened to try Hamdan.
Neither of these congressional Acts, however, expands the President's authority to convene military
commissions. First, while we assume that the AUMF activated the President's war powers, "and that
those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in appropriate circumstances, there
is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended to expand or
alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the UCMJ."). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
518 (2004); see generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 11
(1946).
41 Chesney, supra note 39, at 630.
42 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art., 3 Aug 12. 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Article 118.
43 John Fabian Witt. Law and War in American History, AMERICAN HISTORICA, REVIEW, 777 (2010).
44 Id. at 778 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507; Hamdan 548 U.S. at 557;
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 801 (2008) (Roberts, C. J, dissenting) ("The modest practical results
of the majority's ambitious opinion.")).
45 See NDAA, supra note 5, at §§ 1021-22.
46 Id.

at §§ 1562-65.
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who are suspected to be mounting future attacks as well. Detaining aliens who do
not fall into either of those categories exemplifies the slippery slope stance that
both the Bush and Obama Administrations have maintained. One can argue that
preventive detention is a useful tool for insuring the risks posed by suspected
terrorists can be negated. 4 7 Furthermore, many scholars contend that a utilitarian
framework justifies preventive detention.4 8 However, as this article will argue
that preventive detention may not serve a utilitarian framework better than
criminalizing terrorist acts and using conventional criminal justice methods of
adjudication to do so.
2.

The Politicization of Terrorism

Removing "politics from terrorist acts for purposes of jurisdiction and extradition" may enable the continual development of international legal norms and
treatises and serve as a maximum benefit for future international gains. 4 9 While
this note does not focus on the living conditions or interrogation techniques utilized by either the military or the intelligence community, it is essential in understanding the Guantanamo narrative. For example, a study by the Seton Hall Law
School Center for Policy Research has shown that most of the individuals incarcerated at Guantanamo were not captured by American forces, but were instead
acquired through the use of 'bounty hunters,' and then subsequently were transferred to Guantanamo.5 0 Furthermore, the study analyzed declassified information from the Department of Defense (DoD) and concluded that a majority of
these detainees were 'low-level enemy combatants.' 5 ' This is in stark contrast to
the Bush administration's claims that the United States was incarcerating known
terrorists and dangerous enemy combatants. The significance of authority to use
force in detaining unlawful enemy combatants is inherently derived from the
AUMF, which is in danger of losing its power if hostilities end in the near future. 5 2 The purposes of detention and the trial by military commission are also
delineated in the 'Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
47 See Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, With Application to Preventive Detention for
Suspected Terrorists, 70 Mo. L. Riv. 871, 891 (2011).
48 Id. (citing Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror,
London: Penguin Books (2009); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 693, 698 (2009); Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful
Combatants, and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. Ri-v. 77, 105 (2005)).
49 Zdzislaw Galicki, International Low and Terrorism. 48 AM. BEHAVIORAL ScHu-Nis'r 743, 749
(2005) available at http://www.sagepub.com/martin3studylarticles/Galicki.pdf.
50 See Scott Horton, Law School Study Finds Evidence Of Cover-Up After Three Alleged Suicides At
Guantanamo in 2006, HUFFINGTON Pos'r (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2009/12/07/law-school-study-finds-ev.n_382085.html.

Id.
See Kylie Alexandra, Battlefield Earth: The Danger of Executive Overreach in the Global Fight
Against Terrorism and Why Congress Must Act, 82 Goo. WASH. L. Rr3v. 471, 475-476 (2014); see also
Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), available at
51

52

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/transcript-state-of-the-union-address-2015-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery/2015/01/20/fd8O3c4c-a0ef- II e4-b I 46-577832eafcb4_story.html.
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War Against Terrorism', or Mil. Order 2001.53 Given these purposes of detention, it is curious as to what will happen to the remaining detainees if hostilities
do indeed end. If this becomes reality, the Obama and future administrations, will
have to combat the limited authority that the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld placed on the AUMF's ability to 'detain enemy combatants' once the hostilities end. 5 4 Furthermore, prisoners are not to be detained once hostilities have
ended, per the Geneva Conventions,5 5 "unless they are being lawfully prosecuted
56
or have been lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving sentences."
To better understand the juncture between incorporating international law into
the criminal justice mode, we need to look at the instigating legislation that began
the practice of indefinite detention in the 'War on Terror'. Section two of the
AUMF states:
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons. 57
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 indicates that
there may be evidence that there has been an evolution of scope concerning who
falls into the indefinite detention pit:
A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of
such enemy forces.5 8
While the distinction between alien and non-alien combatant determinations
has come under scrutiny, the Armed Forces are not required to take U.S. citizens
into military custody pending a determination. 5 9 Furthermore, in an appeal to the
Second Circuit, a group of journalists and human rights activists maintained that
53 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833- 57,835 (Nov. 16, 2001). But cf Tucker Culbertson, The Constitution, the Camps, and the
HumanitarianFifth Amendment, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 307, 312-313 (2004).
54 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 507 (2004).
55 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, supra note 42.
56 Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained without
Trial, 44 HARV. INT't. L. J. 503, 510-11 (2003) (citing id. arts. 118, 85, 99, 119, 129; 6 U.S.T., at 3384,
3392, 3406, 3418).
57 AUMF, supra note 9, at § 2(a).
58 See NDAA, supra note 5, at § 1021(b)(2).
59 Id. at § 1022(b)(1) ("The requirement to detain a person in military custody under this section does
not extend to citizens of the United States. (2) . .. The requirement to detain a person in military custody
under this section does not extend to a lawful resident alien of the United States on the basis of conduct
taking place within the United States, except to the extent permitted by the Constitution of the United
States.").
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the Government increased the scope of the original AUMF by positing potential
dangers of indefinite detention on both U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens.
The court maintained:
While it is true that Section 1021(e) does not foreclose the possibility that
previously "existing law" may permit the detention of American citizens
in some circumstances-a possibility that Hamdi clearly envisioned in
any event-Section 1021 cannot itself be challenged as unconstitutional
by citizens on the grounds advanced by plaintiffs because as to them it
neither adds to nor subtracts from whatever authority would have existed
in its absence. 60
The court concluded that existing law regarding the detainment of citizens was
not enumerated in the NDAA and that the plaintiffs essentially lacked standing to
challenge Section 1021 in Article III courts. 61 Furthermore, the court declined to
answer whether the laws of war have any bearing on the indefinite detention
question under Section 1021.62 This ruling vacated an earlier ruling, which
placed a temporary injunction on Section 1021 validity. 6 3 In Al-Bihani, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that, "there is no indication . . . that Congress
intended the international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles
for the President's war powers under the AUMF. [They] as a whole have not
been implemented domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source of
authority for U.S. courts."6 While these arguments delineate alleged shifts in
scope, the determination of how international law as a whole being incorporated
into domestic law will be discussed later.
International vs. Non-International Armed Conflict

C.

The problem of "indefinite detention may be limited to the prisoners at Guantdinamo, at least during an Obama administration . . . including many whom the
government concedes are not terrorists, complete a full decade of detention without charge. Current practices provide precedent for a continued system of preven60 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 193 (2d Cir. 2013).
61 Id. at 204-5 (holding Plaintiffs' "do not have Article Ill standing to challenge the statute because
Section 1021 simply says nothing about the government's authority to detain citizens.").
62 See Hedges, 724 F.3d at 199 ("In these circumstances, we are faced with a somewhat peculiar
situation. The government has invited us to resolve standing in this case by codifying, as a matter of law,
the meaningful limits it has placed on itself in its interpretation of Section 1021. We decline the government's invitation to do so. Thus, we express no view regarding whether the laws of war inform and limit
detention authority under Section 1021 (b)(2) or whether such principles would foreclose the detention of
individuals like Jonsdottir and Wargalla. This issue presents important questions about the scope of the
government's detention authority under the AUMF, and we are wary of allowing a pre-enforcement
standing inquiry to become the vehicle by which a court addresses these matters unless it is necessary.
Because we conclude that standing is absent in any event, we will assume without deciding that Section
1021(b)(2) covers Jonsdottir and Wargalla in light of their stated activities.").
63 See Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
6 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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tive detention well into the future." 65 Nonetheless, it is imperative that states
party to an armed conflict release those detained if at some point during the
hostilities, the reasons necessitating the detention of said persons no longer exists. 6 6 However, this does not mean that "such persons are combatants only for
such time as they take part in the hostilities, but merely that their actual participation is what makes them combatants, and not their membership in a certain organization." 6 7 The Supreme Court in Hamdi accepted that the indefinite
detention of Taliban members was a 'fundamental incident' of war in lieu of
POW status. 68 The Conventions provide a model outlining who qualifies as a
POW in times of an armed conflict. 6 9 POW status only occurs in warring states,
which is not the case in the global War on Terror. Irrespective of the loaded
terminology employed by the U.S. Government, the War on Terror not only is
war with no end, but is also a war without territorial definition.
Nonetheless, "membership in a specific group is a necessary condition for
POW status in five out of six scenarios, and for the most part, it is a sufficient
condition as well. Associational status in that sense is the primary triggering condition for military detention during international armed conflict."7 0

While an international armed conflict consists of two 'High Contracting Parties,'' the non-international armed conflict dubbed the 'War on Terror' transcends the nation-state; analogously rectified as a Manichean fight between good
and evil that should not be constricted to questions of sovereignty. However ironical the task and volition of the executive, it is rather to their benefit that we are
not signatories to Protocol II of the Conventions, given that this would impede
our ability to viably detain unprivileged belligerents.
III. Preventative Action and Right to Self-Defense within International
Law
An important component of understanding why terrorism is currently being
treated as 'war' and not crime revolves around the threat it poses to the state, not
just individual persons. The indiscriminate nature of coercive force may be the
differentiating factor in determining whether preventive action is justified. Before
we address preventive action within the criminal justice system, it is essential to
examine preventive action within international law.
65 Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. -. L. REV. 551, 621
(2013).
66 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 42, at art. 3.
67 N. Rodley, TH! TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 189 (2nd ed., 1999); Col.

K.W. Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21st Century. HPCR Policy
Brief. Jan. 2003, at 14.
68 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
69 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War supra note 42, at art. 3.
70 See Chesney and Goldsmith, supra note 5 at 1085.
71 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 42, at art. 2.
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'Armed Attack' and the 'Military Necessity' doctrine.

A.
1.

Self-Defense vs. Aggression

Many criticize the United States' response to the attacks of 9/11. While there
was no international consensus on the 'laws of war' between state and non-state
actors, the United States' approach was seemingly justified, but certainly not legal. The ambiguities inherent in this crisis stem from the discourse on international humanitarian law, or the 'laws of war.' Nonetheless, many of the
Conventions codified since the end of the Second World War did not clearly give
the United States the jurisdiction to proceed with the 'imminent right of selfdefense' in combating those responsible months later. While both Congress and
the President retain their innate powers in pursuing these aims, they were not
internationally necessary. No nation, particularly members of the UN, would
deny 9/11 was indeed an 'armed attack,' 72 which is a necessary predicate for the
continuance of American's right to self-defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter
states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.7 3
In this, we see ambiguities with regards to definitional interpretation of 'armed
attack' and 'peace.' In its rudimentary form, these words mean exactly what they
encompass. However, under the growing paradigm of international law, which
draws primarily on international customs, there remains what necessarily constitutes an 'armed attack' and what constitutes a maleficent disruption of 'peace.'
As previously mentioned, there seems to be little conflict regarding the applicability of an 'armed conflict' applying to 9/11, despite its definitional
entanglement.
Necessary and Imminence Standards

2.

Regarding the legality of self-defense, customary international law affirms
what Secretary of State Daniel Webster concluded regarding the infamous Caroline case. This case involved British, Canadian and American parties. Settlers
within the Upper Province of Canada were rebelling against the British government and in doing so, had received aid from American supporters by way of the
Caroline. The British forces responded by encroaching into U.S. territory at night
72 Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the 'war against terrorism,' 78, INrRNAnONAL
AFFAIRs 301-317 (2002).
73 U.N. Charter art. 51 para. 1.
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and destroying the ship and its supplies in an effort to circumvent an attack. The
letter to the British ambassador maintained that in that showing a right to selfdefense, a [state] must show:
necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment of deliberation . . ., and that the British force,
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the
territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it. 74
The Caroline case has been lauded as the cornerstone for demonstrating the
specific and necessary requirements that need to be evident before a preemptive
attack of self-defense. It also shows that these matters can be viewed within the
paradigm of the War on Terror like the Caroline case, as the 'necessary' and
imminent nature of the situation originated from non-state actors. Furthermore,
states may not have to show that the threat came from another sovereign nation.7 5
However, the judiciary has shown that "It is the law of self-defense among nations. Like self-defense, it is a use of elemental force sanctioned by common law,
initiated solely by stark necessity and vanishing when the necessity no longer
exists." 7 6 In order for action to constitute a lawful avenue of self-defense, "any
use of force in self-defense under the U.N. Charter requires that it meet the requirements of military necessity, distinctions between civilians and military
targets, proportionality, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering."7 7 To further
this point, when one considers the use of targeted killings in the War on Terror,
". . .[u]nder International Humanitarian Law, use of force in self-defense by a
victim state must conform to the requirements of imminence and proportional78
ity-and hence military necessity-in order to be just."
B.

Just War Tradition

1.

Development of InternationalLaw

The principles underlying the Caroline case are embedded in centuries of international law development within the Just War Tradition. For one, there must
74 Webster, Daniel, Letter to Henry Stephen Fox, in The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, 1841-43 (1983). Excerpt available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carolinetest.
75 Greenwood, supra note 72, at 308.
76 U.S. vs. Minoru Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (citing Ex ParteMilligan 71 U.S. 2
(1866)).
77 David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 347,
386 (2013); see also, Alexander Melnitzky, Defending America Against Cyber Espionage Through the
Use of Active Defenses, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L AND COMP. L. 537, 560-61 (2012); David E. Graham,
Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT'L SECURrrY L. & PoCY 87, 98 (2010); International and
Operational Law Dept., Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Operational Law Handbook,
at 12-14 (2008).
78 Melanie J. Foreman, When Targeted Killing is Not Permissible:An Evaluation of Targeted Killing
Under the Laws of War and Morality, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 921, 936 (2013); see generally Helen
Frowe, THE ErHics OF WAR AND PEACE: AN INTRoi)ucrION 103 (2011).
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be an action that necessitates military action (just cause); the actions must be
proportionate to the warranted armed attack; the intentions of the military is declared prior to actual action; the declaration came from the sovereign; that it is
the last resort, and that it has a reasonable chance of the success in order for it to
be a justifiable act of war. 7 9 While several arguments can be made regarding
whether or not the Just War paradigm applies in state-non-state conflicts, and
whether or not the War on Terror constitutes a war that has a 'reasonable chance
of success,' it is nonetheless imperative to trace some of the historical conditions
that exemplify the contemporary state of international law within this context.
Following World War II, the prosecution of Nazi Officers and officials were
an example of 'universal moral truths' transcending national obligations. 80 The
trials created principles concerning conduct in war and both the strict and vicarious liabilities of those both subordinate and super-ordinate actions, respectively.
Similar to much of the legislation after 9/11, claims that the trials were ex post
facto were not persuasive. Even if individuals being tried for both crimes against
humanity and war crimes, both of which were new legal definitions under the
auspices of international humanitarian law and the laws of war, hadn't violated
laws, which they had.8 ' the International Military Tribunal (IMT) chose to bring
existing law to bear by enforcing both international law and moral truths. The
convergence of natural justice and international humanitarian law was set in motion by making the implicit law explicitly applied. 82 This played a part in making
the laws of war less 'fuzzy' due to the newly systematic enforcement concerning
the conduct of war.83

The War on Terror marks the first global war that transcends both the nationstate and the state as the sole actor in the theatre of war in history. While terrorism is not a new condition, the legal teeth utilized in its submission face a penumbra of issues. Nonetheless, while Geneva Conventions III and IV do not
explicitly authorize the use of force against non-state actors within the current
context, the additional Protocols (I-III) do cover many of the legal issues that are
evident in the enemy combatant-military detention debate. Examining the foundation of the legality of our concentrated efforts is paramount in understanding
and determining both the legality and viability of indefinite detention in combating terrorism.

79 See PAUL CHRISTOPHER, THE ErnIcs OF WAR AND3 PEACE: AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL AND
MORAL Issue7s 82-3 (Pearson-Prentice Hall 2004) (concerning conditions of Just War in alignment with

Hugo Grotius).
80 Id. at 135.
81 See generally Hague Rules of 1907 available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/195, Treaty of
Versailles available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject-menus/versaillesmenu.asp, Kellogg-Briand
Pact available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm, and the Cocarno Pact available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20thscentury/locarno_001.asp.
82 CHRISTOPHER, supra note 79, at 245.
83 MALHAM D. WAKIN, WAR, MORALITY AND THE MILFrARY PROFESSION 373-74 (Westview Press,

1986).
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Hugo Grotius has been deemed the father of international law, 8 4 namely
through his work The Law of War and Peace. Even though this is not a philosophical analysis, it is imperative to briefly examine his main points that are
relevant to indefinite detention as a response to 'preemptive' attacks by terrorists.
His primary point relevant to this analysis was that wars are just if done with
regards to self-defense or when a state has experienced injury at the hands of
another.85 Arguments using the aforementioned framework can be made for both.
For one, the United States operates under the assumption that the hostilities
against it will continue (irrespective of the aggressor), and that those hostilities
necessitate self-defense. Also, the United States experienced injury at the hands
of another, especially during the 9/11 attacks and the 'failed' attempt at the
World Trade Center that occurred in 1993, both exhibited by foreign non-state
actors. This necessitated a response. In Ex Parte Milligan, the Court maintains
that:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures
by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to
seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their
attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of
war. 86
2.

Just Response in Just War

A just response is one where the executive determines the scope and conditions of warfare with Congressional approval.8 7 Nonetheless, war and its character should never constitute more than what its necessary. 8 8 Furthermore, the
Court also ruled that the establishment and prosecution of unlawful belligerents
is warranted and constitutional in times of war. 89 This coincides with the legal
necessity that validates our attempt to not only condemn and punish unlawful
hostilities, whereupon, much has been directly at noncombatants outside the thea84 See CHRISTOPHER, supra note

79.

85 See generally HUGo GRonus, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE

(Kessinger Publishing, LLC,

2004) availableat http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp.htm.
86 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) ("Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to
Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily
given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature and extent
of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it.").
87 See Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) ("Since the Constitution commits to the Executive
and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has
necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature
and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it.").
88 See Raymond v. Thomas 91 U.S. 712, 716 (1875) ("The exercise of military power, where the
rights of citizens are concerned, should never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires.").
89 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 ("Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of
war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but
in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their
belligerency unlawful.").
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tre of war, but to also see to that those we are combating are afforded attenuated
protections. 90
Nonetheless, many could argue that the U.S. toed the line of the incursion
being a legitimate response, within the scope of self-defense, and it being a reprisal. A reprisal does not fall strictly within the bounds of the Just War Tradition.
While states have a legitimate right to self-defense, outlined in the UN Charter,
they are not justified in responding with actions that qualifies as a reprisal. Reprisals are only legitimate when they follow the traditionally lawful form of selfdefense. Legality begins to blur when actions of a state begin to target citizens
and property of other states or specific groups within states. Reprisals against
prisoners of war have been deemed unlawful by the Conventions. 91 General Telford Taylor, primary prosecutor during the Nuremberg Trials maintains that "reprisals . . are not much used today, partly because they are generally ineffective,
and partly because the resort to crime in order to reform the criminal is an unappetizing method." 9 2 It is, however, difficult to distinguish the legal separation of
'self-defense' and 'reprisal,' seeing as the former is a lawful form of the latter,
and the primary precedent within the international legal community is the Nuremberg trials themselves. The trials resulted in the seven primary principles that
outline what constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
While this piece is not about the Just War Tradition, it is essential to understand the principles inherent in customary international law; the origination of
much of the precedent on the laws of war, treatment of POW, and jus in bello
concerning both combatants and non-combatants. The primary objective of lawful reprisals has been to force the enemy back into accordance with the law; thus
ending violations of the laws of war. 93 This last concept is relative to the War on
Terror because our attempts at curbing terrorism fall within the constructs of a
lawful reprisal with regards to lawful self-defense. Our attempts, however, begin
90 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1946) ("Punitive action taken now can be effective only for
the next war, for purposes of military security. And enemy aliens, including belligerents, need the attenuated protections our system extends to them more now than before hostilities ceased . . . . Ample power
there is to punish them or others for crimes, whether under the laws of war during its course or later
during occupation. There can be no question of that. The only question is how it shall be done, consistently with universal constitutional commands or outside their restricting effects.").
91 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners War, art. 2, Jul. 27, 1929, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S., 132 ("Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Power, but not of the individuals or corps who have captured them. They must at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are
prohibited."). See also, Convention Ill ("Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any
unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present
Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or
scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of
the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest. Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be
protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.").
92 See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 79, at 175 (citing TELFORn TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN
AMERICAN TRAGEDY 54 (Quadrangle Books, 1970).
93 See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 79, at 171 ("In the parlance of contemporary international law,
reprisals are acts that would normally be violations of the laws of war but that are exceptionally permitted
as a means of compelling a lawless enemy back into conformity with the law.").
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to get muddled once we try to decipher the intent. The surface intent of the War
on Terror and correlated legislation such as AUMF and the MCA screams for the
defeat of evil and upholding of established interstate order. Nonetheless, the
means by which we have conducted ourselves on many of the fronts within the
war can be criticized for reasons such as: 1) failing to abide by customary international law (irrespective of the fact that we are not signatories to Protocols I or
II), 2) failure to follow procedural and substantive due process regimes, 3) failing
to adequately construct a system that includes other state actors in the adjudication of unlawful belligerents, and 4) undermining the advancement of international law.
IV.

Divergence into a Criminal Justice Model

The utilization of the American criminal justice system may serve as a more
fundamental and efficient means of adjudicating terrorists. This avenue may lead
to increased legitimacy of government, greater transparency, strengthening of the
rule of law, more consistent and equitable legal provisions and remedies, and
decreases in motivated offenders. Through the 'criminalization' of terrorism, we
can depart from the debate between whether terrorism is a criminal act, or an act
of war. 94 Some language used by the courts would suggest that in many respects,
it is 'war.' 9 5 The section below delineates many of the current issues we face in
adjudicating terrorism, and how, shifting to the criminal justice system will increase the efficacy of terrorism prevention and dissolution.
A.

Sentencing and Detention Issues

Despite the prosecution of civilian terrorists within the United States, the introduction of a more 'global' prosecution has yet to enter into fruition. The aforementioned discussions about legislative history, federal precedent, military law,
and the moral and ethical issues concerning the jus in bello doctrine all exhibit
how the United States developed and responded to the War on Terror. What more
can be done to ensure that we are not perpetuating a cyclical conundrum? Some
argue that indefinite detention serves our political objectives of reducing hostilities at home and abroad, while others maintain that it reduces terrorist recidivism.
This is illogical because in order for there to be recidivism, there has to be a
sentence levied. Nonetheless, there has not been much guidance under the current
laws and U.S. sentencing guidelines as to how we might properly adjudicate 'un96
lawful enemy combatants.'
94 J. Harvey Wilkinson, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. Riev. 1099, 1171-72
(2014) (explaining the difficulty in choosing what side terrorism falls under "This is no place to explore
the complicated question of whether alleged terrorism is more aptly regarded as a criminal offense or as
an act of war.").
95 See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that Usama Bin
Laden had declared a 'jihad', meaning holy war, against the United States).
96 Christina P. Skinner, Punishing Crimes of Terror in Article III Courts, 31 YAi L. & Pot'Y REV.
309, 373-374 (2013).
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If we are to create a sentencing framework for terrorist subjects, we need to
explicate a viable model that transcends punishing only actions and determining
'combatant status ' abroad. For example, in an article within the Yale Law and
Policy Review on sentencing guidelines, the author states:
Neither the Sentencing Guidelines nor the terrorism statutes employ military necessity reasoning in setting out the maximum or minimum penalties proscribed for crimes of international terrorism. Some of the federal
terrorism statutes provide for maximum terms of life in prison, but again,
only in limited circumstances, such as where a death results. Otherwise,
the maximum terms of imprisonments are less-the material support statutes, for instance, carry only fifteen-year maximums. 9 7

Furthermore, in construing a more effective mode of adjudication, one that
relies not solely on military discretion, the Government needs to incorporate, at a
minimum, the same procedural and substantive due process rights and evidentiary process applications that our current criminal penal model employs. Furthermore, "[by] leaving the rules of evidence, burdens of proof, and related
procedural safeguards associated with POW and security internee decisions to the
discretion of the detaining power (armed forces) .

.

. [the United States] place[s]

little pressure on militaries to engage in law enforcement-style methods of collecting and preserving evidence." 9 8 While this comports with intuitive measures
of security, the lack of uniform guiding evidentiary and 'procedural' protections
during investigative- and detention-related components of the 'laws of war' or
IHL is problematic. 99
The aforementioned attempts to incorporate the laws of war into detention
policy' 00 have proved extremely problematic. Nonetheless, courts have entertained avenues for how citizens and lawful resident aliens may challenge indefi-

97

18 U.S.C.

§ 2332a-b,

2332d, 2339A-B, 2339D (2012). See also Suppression of the Financing of

Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, §§ 202-203, 116 Stat. 724,
724-28; See generally Bin Laden, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 484; and United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132
(D. Mass. 2002) giving examples of federal cases pertaining to 2332b (C)(1)). See also Skinner, supra

note 91, at 340-352.
98

Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 562.

99 See 10 U.S.C. § 949(a); see also Andy Worthington, Obama Brings Guantanamo and Rendition
(Not Geneva Conventions) to Bagram, THE WORLD CAN'T WAIT (April 9, 2009) http://www.worldcantwait.net/index.php/96-voices-of-resistance/andy-worthington/5849-obama-brings-guantanamo-andrendition-not-geneva-conventions-to-bagram; see also, Lindsey Goldwert, Gitmo Panel Slams Hearing
Process, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 23 2007) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gitmo-panelist-slams-hearing-process/; cf. Andy Worthington, The Guantanamo Whistleblower, A Libyan Shopkeeper, Some Chinese Muslims, and a Desperate Government. HUFFINGTON PosT (Jul. 26 2007) http://www
10 U.S.C.
.huffingtonpost.com/andy-worthington/the-guantanamo-whistleblo b_57857.html; cf
§ 948r(b), § 948 r(c). Garcia et al., supra note 13, at 15 (concerning the prosecution of Guantanamo
Detainees in federal criminal courts, quoting "the use of any such evidence in the criminal trial of a
detainee would likely be subject to legal challenge under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that the
statement was gained through undue coercion. As a general rule, statements made in response to coercive
interrogation methods are inadmissible in U.S. courts.").

100 See supra notes 48-55.
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nite detention policies via Supreme Court precedent.' 0 Furthermore, a problem
that could persist is the stigma that attaches to individuals who are indefinitely
detained. This is more than evident in conventional criminal justice. The plurality
in Hamdi examined some of the varying reasons for detention in war:
The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by "universal agreement and practice," are "important incident[s] of war." (citation omitted). The purpose
of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field
of battle and taking up arms once again. Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 571, 572 (2002)
("[C]aptivity in war is 'neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of
war from further participation in the war."' (citation omitted) ("The time
has long passed when 'no quarter' was the rule on the battlefield . . . . It is
now recognized that 'Captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but 'merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal
character.' . . . 'A prisoner of war is no convict; his imprisonment is a
simple war measure.' ") (citation omitted) ("The object of capture is to
prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed
and from then on must be removed as completely as practicable from the
front, treated humanely and in time exchanged, repatriated or otherwise
released." . . .).102
The debate between processing terrorists through the criminal justice system
or military tribunals is 'contentious.' 103 One scholar furthers this in stating that:
Characterizing terrorism as a military issue, rather than a law enforcement
problem, has the inexorable consequence of expanding the scope of executive discretion, unfettered from the judicial oversight inherent in the
criminal justice system and the need to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. For reasons grounded in separation of powers and institutional
competency, courts are apt to be more deferential to the President when
he acts as Commander-in-Chief, than when he acts as a prosecutor. 104

101 Hedges, supra note 60, at 200 ("The Supreme Court's recognition that a pre-enforcement challenge is justiciable when enforcement is a 'realistic danger' when there is a "credible threat of prosecution, when a plaintiff has an "actual and well-founded fear.").
102

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).

103 Charlie Savage, G.O.P. Takes Hard Line in Pushing Military Trials for All Terrorism Suspects,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 2011, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/28/us/politics/republicans-push-military-trials-for-terrorism-suspects.html?_r-0.
104 Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 335, 369 (2005).
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B.

Macro-Explanations

1.

State Legitimacy

One of the many predictors of terrorism is the perception of state legitimacy,
or a state's ability to retain both citizen and non-citizen trust in state institutions
and governance. An argument that the United States poses significant hegemonic
predispositions towards 'inferior' nations or groups, and the 'War on Terror' is
really the war of ideologies. 05 This leaves the question: where do terrorist's
motives stem from?
Within the macro context, there are several explanations. The legitimacy of
governments serves as a fundamental predictor of many forms of domestic and
international terrorism.' 0 6 In a survey of citizens within Muslim nations, researchers discovered that citizens were less supportive of terrorist attacks against
Americans when they had higher perceptions of U.S. legitimacy and culture, and
were also less supportive of domestic terrorism within their own countries when
perceptions of state legitimacy were higher.' 0 7 Researchers also have found that
weak democratic societies and transitioning societies experience higher terrorism
rates. 0 8 Other research supports the idea that terrorism occurs more often in
weak or failed states.1 09
Another factor is religious fanaticism. Juergensmeyer maintains that terrorism
is a form of symbolic terrorism rather than strategic or anti-western platforms.' 10
Stern contends that both alienation and separation from society create increases
in religious forms of terrorism."' Counter-intuitively, some refute that suicide
bombers commit acts of terrorism as modes of religious sentiment and creed.12
Many researchers maintain that focusing on "strategies aimed at decreasing
the benefits of terrorism through improving the legitimacy of government, solving widespread grievances that produce strain, or attending to situational features
105

Bruce Hoffman, Rethinking Terrorism and CounterterrorismSince 9/11, 25 STUDIES

ANI TERRORISM,

IN CONFIUCT

303, 303-16 (2005).

106 Gary LaFree & Gary Ackerman, The Empirical Study of Terrorism: Social and Legal Research, 5
THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SCIENCE 347, 347-374 (Dec. 2009); Gary LaFree, & Nancy A. Morris, Does Legitimacy Matter? Attitudes toward Anti-American Violence in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia, 58 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY. 689, 689-719 (Sept. 10 2012). See generally Martha Crenshaw,
Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: Consequences of PoliticalViolence, WESLEYAN UNIV. PRESS (1983).
107 See LaFree & Morris, supra note 106.
108 See Krisztina Kis-Katos et al., On the Origin of Domestic and InternationalTerrorism, 28 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY S17, S17-S36 (2011) (claiming that experiences of instabilitydomestic conflict, anarchy and regime transitions-increase likelihood of terror originating from that
nation).
109 See LaFree et al, Global Terrorism And Failed States, in PEACE AND CONFLIcT 39 (JJ Hewitt, J
Wilkenfeld, TR Gurr, ed., 2008); see also Lafree and Ackerman, supra note 107, at 363 ("There is also
evidence that democratization exhibits a curvilinear relationship with terrorism-the highest rates of
terrorist attacks are in countries that are in democratic transition.").
110 MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MINI) OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RisE OF RELIGIOUs VIOLUNCE
(2003).
111 See also JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF Gon: WHY RELIGIOUS MILITANTs KILL (2003).
112 RA PAPE, DYING TO WIN (2005).
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that increase the costs of terrorism might be more effective."' '3 Nonetheless,
significant reviews of literature exist to exemplify the influence that state institutions and legitimacy have on terrorism fruition.' 14 It is not surprising that "perceived legitimacy [is] especially important in predicting terrorism because,
compared with most ordinary crime, terrorism is an especially public type of
deviance."' 1 5 LaFree also writes:
Legitimacy explanations assume that terrorism represents a struggle over
who has the power to define terrorism. Thus, governments may have
many reasons, not all just, for defining particular groups or individuals as
terrorists. And as we have already seen, despite the abhorrent nature of
terrorist violence, disagreement regarding its definition is more widespread and contentious than the classification of any other type of
6
crime."

The Third War

2.

The 'War on Terror' marks the third assault on a form of deviance at the
national level using the 'war' allegory to symbolize our nation's unyielding attempt to stymie acts of terror.' 17 The first two assaults, the War on Crime, and
the War on Drugs, are similar in entitlement but quite dissimilar in nature. The
first two 'wars' focused on national pandemics of crime, but we know that terrorism is much more complex than either of those forms of deviance. For example,
consider the following excerpt:
Compared with ordinary crime and drug crime, terrorism is far less common and is affected by much more than single extraordinary events like
the September 11 attacks. Ordinary crime is to a large extent local; drug
trafficking and terrorism are more likely to cross national borders. But
while drug trafficking and terrorism can involve crossing national borders, the scope of border crossing is far greater for drug crimes than terrorism. And given the poor record of border security in stopping drug
trafficking, the probability of success of border control for stopping the
much less common problem of terrorism is correspondingly

diminished.' I1
Our response, in collaboration with other nations, is a justified and sound response within the confines of international law. From a policy perspective, however, how do our means of adjudications fit within the model for combating
113
JUST.
114
115

Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism, 38 CRIME AND
413, 416 (2009).
Id.; see also Lafree & Ackerman, supra note 106.
LaFree & Ackerman, supra note 106, at 361.
&

116 Id. at 362 (citing BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1998); ScHmiD

JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEw Gumn To ACTORs, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATABASES, THEORIES AN) LITERATURE (North-Holland 1988)).

117 See Gary LaFree, Criminology's Third War, 8 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY 431 (2009).
11s Id. at 441.
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terrorism? In traditional approaches, incarceration's sole purpose to thwart and
deter future crime by relying on both individual specific deterrence and collective
general deterrence for various deviances. It seems indefinite detention may be
undermining deterrence.'1 9 While terrorism is not like any other crime and there
is not a significant and widely-accepted theoretical foundations for its occurrence, how should we proceed in ensuring both swift and consistent punishment,
while also adhering to international norms and law? This comports with the
'evolving standards of decency' doctrine.1 20 While it seems that the overall strategic modality of national defense has shifted from deterrence toward both preemptive and preventive strategies, it is yet to be seen which of the three is most
effective in the New World Order.121 The overall utility of discrete and irreconcilable incarceration methods, on the other hand, cannot amount to serve either
just desserts or a retributivist model.
To an extent there will always be national security interests that must outweigh the balancing interest of a state being whole-heartedly forthcoming. This
issue is no longer discrete and deserves to be reformed. Some scholars maintain
that the lack of transparency is due to a shift away from the Freedom of Information Act, Federal Advisory Committee Act, and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act models and towards greater government secrecy.1 22
3.

Counter-productivity of Military Model

From a criminological perspective, if we are to deter terrorism, or even preempt it, we cannot do so behind a veil of secrecy. Soldiers often commit 'war
crimes' due to their lack of knowledge on the classification of such and the promulgation of the just war doctrine would improve the efficacy of international
law.1 2 3 It cannot be argued that terrorists do not know their activities are illegal.
However, due to the lack of celerity and inconsistent adjudication methods, terrorists are, to an extent, 'winning' the War on Terror. This is due in part by
purveying our response at Guantanamo and other detention centers abroad as
equally unjust and barbaric. In essence, our actions only further delegitimize our
objectives in the War on Terror. Our policies may actually be counterproductive.1 2 4
119 See generally Brad Roberts, Deterrenceand WMD Terrorism: CalibratingIts Potential Contribu-

tions to Risk Reduction (Institute for Defense Analysis IDA Paper no. P-4231 2007); Pedahzur & Perliger
. The changing nature of suicide attacks: a social network perspective. Soc. Forces 84:1983-2000
(2006).
120 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
121 See Damon Coletta, Unipolarity, Globalization and the War on Terror: Why Security Studies
Should Refocus on Comparative Defense, 9 INT'L STUD. Ruv. 385, 397 (2007).
122 Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I Steinzor, The People's Agent: Executive Branch Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 69-SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 113-14 (2005).
123 See CHRISTOPHER, supra note 79, at 113-114.
124 See LaFree & Dugan, supra note 113, at 424 ("According to Donohue, as a liberal democracy, the
United States must appear to respond immediately to attacks against its citizens. However, others ...
claim that by aggressively countering terrorism, the United States and other countries may also be undermining their legitimacy and increasing popular support for those who use terrorist methods."). See generally Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Eric S. Dickson, The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism,
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Many find the court systems encompass both "fair, impartial, and effective
judicial systems and a non-arbitrary basis according to which laws and the legal
system as a whole can be viewed as legitimate."l 2 5 Herein lies one of the issues
with our use of indefinite detention regarding the War on Terror. First and foremost, if the United States creates the image that we are a 'leading nation, one
whose democratic ideals should be followed by other countries,' 26 we are undermining our own legitimacy by acting in both arbitrary and variant forms of adjudication, according to the aforementioned model. Secondly, if terrorism is to be
curtailed by advancing a myriad of democratic norms while simultaneously increasing the level of perceived legitimacy of our nation, wouldn't indefinite detention, or the threat of it, seemingly violate these notions?
Scholars call for reducing both opportunities for terrorists and the vulnerabilities of our security by decreasing the benefits of terrorism to the perpetrators
through increasing the legitimacy of the government.1 2 7 This is primarily due to
the complex social, cultural and psychological elements of terrorism that are both
hard to elucidate and target with a single policy.1 2 8 Put another way, the policies
and means of adjudicating terrorism may be the real enemy and only further
perpetuating the 'war.' 29 Researchers studying the relationship between physical
integrity rights of terrorists and aggregate effects on both international and domestic terrorism have found that:
Governments that refrain from imprisoning citizens for political reasons
and avoid engaging in disappearances and extrajudicial killings experience less domestic and international terrorism . . . . By a significant margin, improvement in respect for rights against political imprisonment and
Counterterrorism,and Mobilization, 51 AM. J. oF PoL. Sc. 364 (2007); Kevin Siqueira, & Todd Sandier,
TerroristBacklash, Terrorism Mitigation, and Policy Delegation,9 J. O- PUB. EcON. 91 (2007); Audrey
K Cronin, How al-QaidaEnds, 31 INT'L SECURrrY 7, (2007).
125

Seung-Whan Choi, Fighting Terrorism Through the Rule of Law?, 54 J. oF CoNmLicT

RESOL.

940,

944 (2010).
126 See Foreman, supra note 78, at 936.
127 See LaFree & Dugan, supra note 113, at 416 ("It would be very beneficial for future research on
terrorism to expand beyond traditional deterrence perspectives to include theories that incorporate legitimacy, strain, and situational variables. This strategy is supported by some recent research suggesting that
strategies aimed at decreasing the benefits of terrorism through improving the legitimacy of government,
solving widespread grievances that produce strain, or attending to situational features that increase the
costs of terrorism might be more effective than strategies based only on increasing punishment. In general, despite the enormous resources devoted to countering terrorism, we have surprisingly little empirical
information about which strategies are most effective. One conclusion seems certain: the divergent reactions by terrorists across differing contexts strongly suggest that selecting an appropriate counterterrorism
strategy is not a task that should be taken lightly."). See generally John Braithwaite, Pre-empting Terrorism, 17 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96 (2005).
128 See generally LaFree & Ackerman, supra note 106 (citing generally RONALD V. CLARKE, AND)
GRAEME R. NEWMAN, OUTSMARTING THE TERRORISTs (2006)).
129 Id. (citing Clark McCauley, Psychological Issues in UnderstandingTerrorism and the Response to
Terrorism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM (C. Stout ed., Praeger 2003); Clark McCauley, Psychological Issues in UnderstandingTerrorism and the Response to Terrorism, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM (B. Bongar, L. M. Brown, L. E. Beutler, J. N. Breckenridge, and P. G. Zimbardo eds., Oxford
University Press 2006)).
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extrajudicial killings yield the most dramatic reduction in terrorist
attacks. 130
Put bluntly, "it must be recognized that terrorism is fundamentally a form of
psychological warfare . . . designed to undermine confidence in government and
leadership and to rent the fabric of trust that bonds society." 1 3' While responses
to our counterterrorism policies can successfully curb both international and domestic terrorism, they can also do the reverse, as evident from some of the aforementioned empirical studies. In essence, we need to fight fire with fire, or as
Jerald Post suggests, "counter psychological warfare with psychological warfare." 1 32 How is this best done? Destabilizing the network of terrorists would be
a viable form of preventive warfare. This can be done by 1) reducing the flow of
communication within the terrorist organization; 2) hampering decision-making
and consensus formation; and 3) intensifying collective-action problems and security vulnerability.1 3 3 Post adds supplemental factors: 1) inhibiting potential recruits from joining; 2) producing tension within groups; 3) facilitating exits from
groups; and 4) reducing external support for groups and their leaders would serve
to thwart the growth of terrorism.1 34 While it should remain obvious that we
cannot fight the War on Terror using conventional methods, we need an adjudication process that subverts the overall objectives of terrorists in conjunction
with adaptive and technologically superior methods as well.
Despite the numerous definitions for terrorism,13 5 if acts of terror are meant to
coerce another state into politically capitulating to their demands, or instilling
fear within a population of people in hopes of undermining government legitimacy, then how can our judiciary best help subvert those aims? Terrorism is not
a new phenomenon, but is what many see as acts of violence by the weak.1 36 If
the intention of terrorists is to achieve some form of ideological, religious, or
political goal, then the bulwark of how we diffuse and 'destabilize' those attempts begin with the rule of law. Military and political ambitions aside, if we
lack a strong and decisive rule of law in adjudicating both domestic and international acts of terror that target the United States, then we can never fully quell
this continuing generation of terror. For one, there is no inherent 'glory' or purpose that be achieved if an individual or group is in prison. The way we regain
&

130 James A. Piazza & James I. Walsh, Physical Integrity Rights and Terrorism, 43 PS: POL. ScI.
Potrrics 411, 412 (2010); see also James Walsh & James A. Piazza, Why Respecting Physical Integrity
Rights Reduces Terrorism, 43 COMPARATIVE Pot. STuD. 551 (2010).
131 See Hoffman, supra note 105, at 313.
132 JERROLD M. POST, LEADERS AND) THEIR FOLLOWERS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF PoLIricALt BEHAVIOR 161 (2004).
133 Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Calvert Jones, Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why alQaida May Be Less Threatening Than You Think, 33 INT'I. SECUarry 7, 43 (2008).
134 PosT, supra note 132, at 160. See generally Jerrald Post, Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM: PSYCHOLOGIES, 1I)EOLOGIES,
THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 25 (Walter Reich ed.,1990). See also Jerrold Post, The New Face Of
Terrorism: Socio-CulturalFoundations Of Contemporary Terrorism, 23 BEHAV. Sci. LAW 451 (2005).
135 See generally SCHMID & JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEw GUIDE'rO AcroRs, AUTHORS,
CONCErTS, DATABASES, THEORIES AND LITERATURE. (1988). See also LaFree, supra note 109.
136 See generally TARAK BARKAWI, GLOBALIZATION AND WAR (2006).
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our moral high ground, which has been under criticism throughout the War on
Terror, is by 'reducing acts of terror to common criminality."' 3 7 In essence, the
military alone cannot win this war.' 38 While the scope of this article is not to
analyze all of the law enforcement strategies in both assessing and enforcing state
and federal laws against various acts of terror, it goes without saying how important the criminal justice system will be in operationalizing the national effort
against terrorism. Preventive measures should always be employed, as they are
with regards to 'normal' criminal activity like burglary, larceny, arson, and drug
trafficking. This can even include preventive modes of detention, as the "Department of Justice officials have used preventative methods of detention, whether on
the groups of inchoate crimes or material witness applications, with regards to
protecting intelligence assets while at the same preventing terrorists from acting
on United States soil."' 3 9 Again however, the responsibility of both deterring and
razing acts of terror needs to reside within the legal system because our Constitution is the final, albeit necessary, check on authority. 1 4 0
It could be argued that both Guantanamo and prisons throughout the Middle
East utilized during the War on Terror serve these aforementioned purposes.
They incarcerate individuals who are both suspected and confirmed terrorists and
provide both specific and general deterrence to the remaining members of their
respective terrorist organizations. Furthermore, penal facilities operate within the
bounds of legal authority. They have been authorized, vetted and deemed constitutional by all three branches during their evolution. Lastly, penal facilities contribute to the overall objective of 'incarcerating our way out of terrorism' by
placing individuals who are either terrorists, or exhibit the potential to be future
recruits and inevitable recidivists in prison.
C.

Why Indefinite Detention?

The logical reasoning behind indefinitely detaining or incarcerating an individual stems from the determination that the individual still poses a significant threat
to society. This determination is not particular to just international or military
law, but has roots in both civil and criminal law within the United States. One
example is the continued and involuntary civil commitments of sex offenders
upon completion of their sentences. 14 1 Another is the indefinite detention meth137 See generally Marc Sageman, The Next Generation of Terror, March/April, FOREIGN POLICY, 37
(2008).
138 See generally Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still
Matters, May/June, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 133 (2008).

139 See generally Robert Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-SupportLaws and the Demands
of Prevention, 42 HARV. J.LEGIs 1 (2001).
140 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
141 Meaghan Kelly, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 551, 553 (2007) ("In general, SVP laws
provide for the post-incarceration involuntary civil commitment of sex offenders after a finding that the
individual: (1) committed a sexually violent act; (2) suffers from a mental abnormality or a personality
disorder; and (3) is likely to pose a future danger as a result of his mental abnormality. These criteria are
relatively vague, but if they are deemed satisfied, the sex offender will remain in civil commitment
indefinitely until he is determined no longer to be dangerous as a result of his mental abnormality. Civil
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ods utilized during the removal period of an alien by INS "until it has been
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 'reasonably
foreseeable future." 4 2 This seemingly constituted a period of six months, after
which, the constitutionality would be called into question.1 4 3 This removal period
is also affected by whether the individual still poses a risk to society.1 44 However, the discretion to indefinitely detain is not unboundedl 4 5 because deportation
and removal proceedings are civil and not under the 'panoply' of protections that
criminal trials are privy to.1 46 Furthermore, the U.S. has a history of preventively
detaining mentally ill personsl 4 7 and those who pose a significant health risk to
other citizens.' 4 8

The decision to indefinitely detain may be more political than punitive. The
attachment of terrorism as an international security issue enables the Executive to
deem the 'right' response to be our Armed Forces. Furthermore, if the threat
itself is 'imminent,' the government will care less about substantive or procedural
due process measures that would promote and ensure consistency in processing
terrorists. When such a threat is imminent, the courts are more likely to defer to
government authority. 149 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated
numerous reasons for pushing terrorists through the military detention instead of
the criminal justice system.' 5 0 Regarding Jose Padilla, an individual who was
found to have had the intent of gathering radioactive materials in an attempt to
construct a 'dirty bomb,' and whom had ties to al-Qaeda, Rumsfeld placed a
premium of gathering information first, before processing Padilla.' 5 ' Rumsfeld
maintained that:
commitment need not be imposed at the time of the original sentencing but can be imposed at the end of
the prison sentence.").
142 Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001). See also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231.
143 Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1099 (citing U.S. v. Witkovich 353 U.S. 194 (1957)); see also 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1252).
144 Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d. 892, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Authorized indefinite detention of
an excluded alien convicted of an aggravated felony beyond the statutory removal period codified in
§ 1252(c)); see Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir.1991) ("When read in the context
of the whole 1990 Act, it is clear that [former § 1226(e)] is part of a scheme requiring the Attorney
General to detain all aliens convicted of aggravated felonies whose release would pose a threat to
society.").
145 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 377 (2005).
146 See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Since deportation and removal
proceedings are civil, they are 'not subject to the full panoply of procedural safeguards accompanying
criminal trials' including the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.").
147 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
148

See A. John Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEPW. L. REv.

1227, 1269-71 (2006).
149 See Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Innocence: Judicial Risk Assessment in the Post-9/H1

World, 35

L. REv. 415, 1452 (2014) (arguing that Padilla v. Rumsfeld depicted the Judiciary as deferring
to government authority, so as to decline jurisdiction, in cases whether the threat is perceived as
imminent).
150 Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing News
Briefing, Department of Defense (June 12, 2002), 2002 WL 22026773).
151 Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 573-74.
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It seems to me that the problem in the United States is that we have-we
are in a certain mode. Our normal procedure is that if somebody does
something unlawful, illegal against our system of government, that the
first thing we want to do is apprehend them, then try them in a court and
then punish them. In this case that is not our first interest.
Our interest is to-we are not interested in trying him at the moment; we
are not interested in punishing him at the moment. We are interested in
finding out what he knows. Here is a person who unambiguously was
interested in radiation weapons and terrorist activity, and was in league
with al Qaeda. Now our job, as responsible government officials, is to do
everything possible to find out what that person knows, and see if we
can't help our country or other countries. 152
He later offered more evidence supporting why differentiating between criminal procedure and the processing of terrorists should remain:
If you think about it, we found some material in Kandahar that within a
week was used-information, intelligence information-that was used to
prevent a[t] least three terrorist attacks in Singapore-against a U.S. ship,
against a U.S. facility and against a Singaporean facility. Now if someone
had said when we found that information or person, well now let's us
arrest the person and let's start the process of punishing that person for
having done what he had did, we never would have gotten that information. People would have died.

.

So I think what our country and other countries have to think of is, what
is your priority today? And given the power of weapons and given the
number of terrorists that exist in the world, our approach has to [be] to try
to protect the American people, and provide information to friendly countries and allies, and protect deployed forces from those kind of attacks . .
I think the American people understand that.1 53
D.

Applying International Law and Treaties to U.S. Courts

1.

Can Domestic Criminal Law Alone Deter Terrorism?

Many contend that the Charming Betsy canon ought to apply in situations
where vague legislation requires that judges look to international treaties and
customary law for insight on how to construct an amiable interpretationl 5 4 histor152 Id. at 574.
153 Id.

154 See generally Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64 (1804); see also Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. 1, 43 (1801) ("The laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to
infract the common principles and usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law."); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 111(3) (1986) ("Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law
and to international agreements of the United States, except that a 'non-self-executing' agreement will
not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation."); see also Rebecca Crootof,
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ically relating to prescriptive jurisdiction.1 5 5 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
ruled in Al-Bahani v. Obama that "international-law principles found in non-selfexecuting treaties and customary international law, but not incorporated into stat56
Furtherutes or self-executing treaties, are not part of domestic U.S. law."'
more, the Court held that customary international law is:
a kind of international common law. It does not result from any of the
mechanisms specified in the U.S. Constitution for the creation of U.S.
law. For that reason, although norms of customary international law may
obligate the United States internationally, they are not part of domestic
U.S. law. Customary-international-law norms become part of domestic
U.S. law only if the norms are incorporated into a statute or self-execut7
ing treaty.' 5

Thus, if legislation or international multilateral agreements are ratified within
the United States and made 'self-executing,' then the informal tacit of incorporating principles into domestic law would be less difficult to achieve. This, in turn,
relates to aforementioned propensity of the United States to abstain from ratifying Protocols I and II of the Geneva Convention. Even though it was seemingly
convenient during times where, absent certain domestic law, the United States
relied on international customary law to discern its proper stance on an issue.
Nonetheless, now that we are more 'fortified' in both our legal prowess and
stance within the international system, it seems both trivial and counterproductive for us to rely on other ambient nations laws. The Medellin decision by the
United States Supreme Court surprised many nations because of its ban on private litigants applying international customs and law in court.158 Also, even
though we were signatories to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, it
was not clear when international treaties and law are domestically equivalent or
enforceable in court, and when they are only binding after Congress has enacted
appropriate legislation. 159
Another conundrum is whether U.S. criminal law can be efficiently applied to
preventive forms of terrorist threat. In a case surrounding the potential negative
impact drug trafficking has on both national security and well-being, the Ninth
Circuit ruled in U.S. v. Patterson that "there was more than a sufficient nexus
with the United States to allow the exercise of jurisdiction [and that] drug trafJudicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon. 120 YALE L. J. 1784,
1789 (2011).
155 See Zachary D. Clopton. Replacing the PresumptionAgainst Extraterritoriality,94 B.U. L. REV. 1,
24-25 (2013) ("By applying the Charming Betsy canon to prescriptive jurisdiction, courts can interpret
geoambiguous statutes to apply only as far as international law permits."). The Charming Betsy canon
has also been used by the Supreme Court with regards to prescriptive justice in Hartford Fire Ins. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) and McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963).
156 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("Responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.").
157 Id. at 17.

158 See Oona Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37
YALE J. INT'L L. 51, 52 (2012). See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
159 Id. at 52.
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ficking may be prevented under the protective principle of jurisdiction, without
any showing of an actual effect on the United States."' 60 Thus, "if the activity
threatens the security or governmental functions of the United States" the United
States can apply jurisdictional claims.161 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit also
stated that "a foreign vessel on the high seas becomes subject to the operation of
the laws of the United States within the meaning of [14 U.S.C.] section
89(a) when those aboard are engaged in a conspiracy to violate federal narcotics
statutes." 1 62 The court drew off a similar Fifth Circuit case just two years prior:
United States v. Cadena.16 3 The court held that despite possible legal issues surrounding Government apprehension and detention that "the violation of international law ... may be redressed by other remedies and does not depend upon the
granting of what amounts to an effective immunity from criminal prosecution to
safeguard individuals against police or armed forces misconduct."'6 Even if the
government plausibly commits illegal acts, it does not mean that the individual
can gain standing in a case against the government's initial motivation for apprehension. The court in Cadena further claimed that "[e]ven if individuals have
standing to raise treaty violations, their personal rights are derived from the rights
of a signatory state. Article 32 of the Convention' 65 provides that it is subject to
ratification."' 66 This seems to limit the ability of detainees to question whether or
not their rights were violated within Protocols I and II. To acquiesce this point,
the Second Circuit has also stated that only signatory nations to a treaty can
protest its violation.1 67 This calls into question the applicability of non-citizens
rights in exigent circumstances, which in our current state of affairs, is the War
on Terror. In Eyde v. Robertson (1884), the Supreme Court stated:
And such is, in fact, the case in a declaration of war, which must be made
by congress, and which, when made, usually suspends or destroys existing treaties between the nations thus at war. In short, we are of opinion
that, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation
can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as congress may pass for its enforcement,
modification, or repeal.1 68
Even if international law was binding on the United States, the Government
retains the authority to change the direction of such law's utility within the judicial system. Put another way, the government in times of declared war can sus160 U.S. v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1987).
161 Id. at 494.

162 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 (5th Circ. 1979); see also 14 U.S.C.A.
163 United States v. Cadena-Sanchez, 68 F.3d. 466, 466 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiarn).

§

89 (2006).

164 United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1261 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled by United States v.
Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d 738 (1983).
165 Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas art. 32, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S.
11.
166 Id.

167 United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975).
168 Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884).
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pend treaties between warring nations. However, the War on Terror does not fall
under the paradigm of conventional war and there are no treaties or laws directly
between the United States and non-state actors, despite laws between nations
applying indirectly in this manner. Furthermore, Afghanistan is a signatory to all
of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, while Iraq is subject to the Conventions but only to Protocol I. Since the U.S. does have the signatory relationship
with those states, due to differences in both being parties to, and ratifying all of
the Protocols, it makes it easier for the U.S. to distance itself from having to
abide by international law with regards to the laws of war principles discussed
earlier, and detention procedures and rights for those in an armed conflict. Put
simply, the U.S. is not buying in to the global application of alien detention
practices, so is it less likely that the United States will think alien detention could
be done better domestically.
2.

The Debate of 'Self-Executing' Treaties

International law and treaties between nations can be contractual in nature.1 69
Nonetheless, the lack of explicit applicability to national laws renders many laws
non-self-executing. Determining whether international law is self-executing or
not, however, is a vibrant double standard. Traditionally, "there should be a
strong presumption that a treaty is self-executing unless the contrary is clearly
indicated,' because if the treaty has been in effect and has not been implemented
by legislation 'a finding that it is not self-executing in effect puts the United
States in default on its international obligations."' 7 0 Consider the following excerpt from Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004):

We assume, too, that no development in the two centuries from the enactment of [28 U.S.C.A] § 1350 to the birth of the modem line of cases
beginning with Filartigav. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (C.A.2 1980), has
categorically precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the
law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has not in any
relevant way amended § 1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute. Still, there are good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause
of action of this kind. Accordingly, we think courts should require any
claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
169 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) ("A treaty is in
the nature of a contract between nations."); Wash. v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979) ("A treaty, including one between the United States and an Indian tribe,
is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations."); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931)
("As treaties are contracts between independent nations, their words are to be taken in their ordinary
meaning as understood in the public law of nations."); Edye, 112 U.S. at 598.
170 Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of Customary InternationalLaw in Federal and State Court Litigation, 26 U. HAw. L. Ri-v. 361, 376 (2004) (quoting Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar
Schachter & Hans Smit, INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (Louis Henkin ed., 3d ed. 1993).
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specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized.' 7 1
Balancing the interests of foreign policy and the evolving landscape of international norms integration into law is something that may prove difficult for federal
judges to accomplish. This is why interpretations of national interests are primarily the duties of Congress and the Executive. Nonetheless, there remains a place,
however restricted, for judges to make international law a formidable part of
domestic law. This is important in the evolution of the War on Terror and its
subsequent impact on how to adjudicate terrorists. Differentiating between selfexecuting and non-self-executing determines how far international law will permeate our substantive and procedural measures regarding our national response
to terrorism. It is no secret that many nations have called for Guantanamo Bay to
be closed due to the litany of humanitarian and ethical concerns that have been
cast into the limelight, furthered only by the questionable legality of the detention
itself. Within criminal justice, only capital punishment is debated as often as the
detention and legal methods we have employed in the War on Terror. Courts'
involvement in the international specter of customary law will provide the criminal justice system a way to partake in adjudicating terrorists and their respective
organizations. This engagement has shifted over time:
Between 1790 and 1947, the Court found a treaty self-executing on the
basis that a private right was secured by the treaty in at least twenty-two
cases. In each case, the Court held not only that the treaty was self-executing, but also that it created a private right of action. The treaties from
which the Court inferred this right to private enforcement fell into four
areas: (1) contract matters; (2) property and inheritance law matters; (3)
the right to challenge the legality of detention through a writ of habeas
72
corpus; and (4) rights to carry on a trade.1
3.

International Transparency

Even though local law enforcement and federal agencies monitor and process
individuals within our criminal justice system, the viability of the assault on terrorism following the 9/11 -attacks can only be increased with greater transparency, cooperation, intelligence gathering, consistent procedural and
substantive due process measures, and moral appeasement to the world. Cutting
off the Judiciary from this process, as both the Executive and Congress have
done, only further undermines our ability to thwart the scope of terrorism's reach
because it conveys a weak rule of law not only to the rest of the world but most
importantly to those non-state actors we fear the most. Multiple times, the Senate
"has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the Interna171 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
172 Hathaway, supra note 158, at 57-58.

Volume 12, Issue 2

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

141

Indefinite Detention in the War on Terror
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-executing." 7 3
Courts will not always interpret claims or assertions in the favor of the international community. This should not weaken their ability to utilize international
customs or explicit international law in domestic situations. Courts need to retain
the ability to determine the efficacy of an international law in light of domestic
situations. Though an international terrorist attack requires an international response, it also requires national policies that delineate various constraints or legal
obstacles. Simply, while individual assertions concerning what policies will be
most effective in thwarting terrorism at the national and global levels may be
determined at the national level, it is important for all nations taking part in this
assault to maintain transparent and analogous principles that create and uphold
fundamental natural rights. In Saleh v. Titan Corp (2006), the District Court of
the District of Columbia heard numerous Iraqi nationals' complaints that they
were tortured by the same private government contractors who provided interrogators and interpreters to the U.S. Armed forces. The court ruled that "the conduct of private parties described by plaintiffs' allegations was not actionable
under the ATS's grant of jurisdiction as violative of the law of nations," even if
was under the 'color of law.' 74
In sum, courts can chose to either defer to government authority and ignore
international law or decide to incorporate international law domestically. The
latter provides more collaborative strength and preserves the rule of law within
and across nations. Furthermore, domestic criminal law may have some gaps in
addressing terrorism. Only time will tell if those gaps will be filled by international law and transnational response.
V.

Criminalizing Terrorism

The debate continues between civilian and military models as modes of adjudicating terrorists. Some experts claim that the military model offers less procedural and substantive hurdles while maintaining flexibility, but the criminal
model poses the most significant barriers to easily processing terrorists. 75 Consider the following except from Chesney and Goldsmith:
173 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
174 Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 2006); see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan,
770 F.2d 202, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding alleged actions by executive officials, in their private
capacity, of supporting forces bearing arms against government of Nicaragua did not violate any treaty or
"customary international law" so as to confer original jurisdiction upon district court over suit by citizens
and residents of Nicaragua against federal officials pursuant to the alien tort statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350,
which provides that district court shall have jurisdiction of action by alien for tort committed in violation
of law of nations or treaty of the United States); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d 10, 20 (D.D.C.
2005) (noting district court did not have diversity jurisdiction over claims by Iraqi nationals who were
detained in Iraqi prison against a private governmental contractor incorporated in The Netherlands, who
provided interrogators to United States military in Iraq); cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (stating the district
courts are vested with original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States).
175 Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1080-1081 ("These detention models have traditionally
differed along two dimensions: detention criteria (i.e., what the government must prove to detain someone) and procedural safeguards (i.e., the rights and procedures employed to reduce the risk of error in
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Neither model in its traditional guise can easily meet the central legal
challenge of modern terrorism: the legitimate preventive incapacitation of
uniformless terrorists who have the capacity to inflict mass casualties and
enormous economic harms and who thus must be stopped before they act.
The traditional criminal model, with its demanding substantive and procedural requirements, is the most legitimate institution for long-term incapacitation. But it has difficulty achieving preventive incapacitation.
Traditional military detention, by contrast, combines associational detention criteria with procedural flexibility to make it relatively easy to incapacitate. But because the enemy in this war operates clandestinely, and
because the war has no obvious end, this model runs an unusually high
risk of erroneous long-term detentions, and thus in its traditional guise
17 6
lacks adequate legitimacy.
Where do we go from here? If neither one is adequate, how can our nation
delegitimize terrorism as a form of politically or religiously coercive violence
and abstain from capitulating to terrorist demands and goals while maintaining
and strengthening a rule of law? The previous section explains why the criminal
justice model is both necessary and sufficient to address the terrorist threat. This
section explains in greater detail how further 'criminalizing' terrorism may be
the way to adopt the criminal justice model. 7 7
A.

Is criminalization necessary?

How does using the criminal justice system to adjudicate all forms of terrorism
come to fruition? Prosecuting terrorists is not a novel concept in the American
criminal justice system. However, over the last two decades, it has partially subverted to military and executive oversight. We treat terrorism as an act of war,
rather than as a crime. 178 Nonetheless, there is a fundamental legal reason for
treating terrorists as criminals.' 7 9 Before U.S. involvement in the War on Terror,
"the conventional mindset was that acts of terrorism were a criminal matter to be
adjudicated within our criminal justice system along with crimes committed by
making detention determinations). The military detention model is the least demanding, traditionally
requiring a showing of mere group membership in the enemy armed forces and providing alleged detainees with relatively trivial procedural protections. At the other extreme, the civilian criminal model is the
most demanding, tending to require a showing of specific criminal conduct and providing defendants
with a panoply of rights designed to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions.").
176 Id. at 1081.
177 While terrorism itself is already criminalized within U.S. Code, focusing on terrorism as a criminal
act rather than stigmatizing it as a religious, social, or political act alone may serve both America's vital
interests while also circumventing terrorism more efficiently.
178 See David T. Hartmann, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda and the War on Terror: Desper-

ate Times Do Not Always Call for Desperate Measures, 22 GEO. MASON. U. Civ. Ris. L. J. 217, 235
(2012) (discussing President Obama's shift away from his predecessor's policy to treat terrorism as war
179 David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda within the Law of War, 51 Wm.
MARY

&

rather than as crime).

L. Ray. 957, 967 (2009) (noting that there is an indisputable basis for the treatment of terrorists as

criminals).
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bank robbers, car thieves, and drug dealers." 8 0 Many times we have "successfully tried and convicted in federal criminal court, including the Oklahoma City
bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, the Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski, and the 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef."'1 8 Nonetheless, the prosecution of terrorists in the criminal justice system poses significant
hurdles because it consumes an extreme amount of time and resources-1 82 as was
evident in the Moussaoui trial.' 83 Additionally, law enforcement agencies will
have to balance intelligence and evidence gathering.1 84
In the debate over Miranda warnings for terrorism suspects, the Executive
Branch's continued commitment to prosecuting terrorists in Article III courts and
the military system makes the question of admissibility of evidence pressing and
relevant.'1 5 Many believe that trying terrorists in military commissions is preferable because they remove several procedural safeguards present in the criminal
justice system to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. However, the federal criminal justice system is no less effective in prosecuting
terrorists.1 8 6
It is time, then, for a new approach to counterterrorism detention that recognizes the advantages that the criminal justice system offers for defendants and
counterterrorism efforts. The criminal justice system is highly effective at detaining and prosecuting terrorists and provides a level of predictability, legitimacy,
and flexibility that is missing in current wartime prosecution and detention practice. The well-established procedural protections within the criminal justice system can reduce the risk of error and provide more legitimate results than those in
the military commission process. A more fair and flexible detention regime will
also effectively contribute to counterterrorism operations.' 8 7
Adherence to the Fifth Amendment is not as stringent in military tribunals as it
is in criminal courts.' Along with the Fifth Amendment, both the Fourth and
Sixth Amendments were purposely left as 'uncertain at best.' 89 Furthermore,
while prosecution of terrorism follows a nationalist guideline and citizens are
180 Alberto R. Gonzales, Waging War Within the Constitution, 42 TEX. TECH. L. Ruv. 843, 861
(2010).
181 Hartmann, supra note 178, at 236-37.
182

Gonzales, supra note 180, at 865-66.

See generally United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004); Harry Samit, An Account
of the Arrest and Interview of Zacarias Moussaoui, 37 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 5191 (2011) (discussing
183

the details of Moussaoui's detainment).
184
NELL
185

M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORJ.L. & Pun. Pot'Y 319, 353-54 (2003).
Savage, supra note 103.

Christie Tomm, The United States Criminal Justice System: Protecting ConstitutionalRights and
National Security, 26 J. Civ. Rrs. & EcON. Diy. 1051, 1054-58 (2009).
186

187

Hathaway, supra note 158, at 77.

188 See 10
189
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processed through the criminal justice system smoothly,1 90 if you are not a citi-

zen, it is much different. Processing terrorists through the criminal justice system
helps in "disrupt[ing] terrorist plots by taking conspirators into custody; incapacitating convicted terrorists through incarceration; and providing a vehicle for gathering intelligence through interrogations." 1 91
B.

What would it look like?

1.

Addressing the Disjunction Between Domestic and Military Policing

Setting aside legal, theoretical and idealist arguments, what would this full
integration of terrorism into the criminal justice system look like? One obvious
difference would be the problematic component of 'policing abroad.' It would be
extremely difficult to uphold procedural safeguards throughout the broad spectrum of how we are currently policing the War on Terror. The litany of the
United States and other nations' arresting powers to combat terrorism only enflames this problem. To put in perspective, current criminal procedure in the
American criminal justice system adheres to specific due process standards,
which enable constitutional rights to be upheld throughout the immensely fragmented criminal justice system. Whether or not these safeguards and rights are
upheld 'uniformly' is not the argument here, it is the complete disjunction that
has occurred between police and military adjudication standards. This includes,
but is not limited to: evidentiary standards, due process rights, detention procedures, policing practices, administrative policies, and overall adherences to system-specific law (i.e. criminal law vs. UCMJ, International Treaties, Executive
Orders, etc).
A much simpler answer involves existing laws that govern terrorism. The
United States Code defines international terrorism as activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State, appear to
be intended-to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 192
This operates on a broad spectrum regarding territoriality. Crimes committed,
or inchoate crimes may be criminalized as terrorist acts irrespective of where the
act or premonition originates from. The major differentiation between this definition from that of 'domestic terrorism' is where the act occurs, or if it would have
violated United States law.1 93 Furthermore, punishments for terrorism under fedSee Kim D. Chanbonpin, Ditching "The Disposal Plan:" Revisiting Miranda in an Age of Terror,
Thomas L. Rev. 155, 174-75 (2008).
Tomm, supra note 186, at 1055.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2001).
193 Regarding the territorial differentiation, international terrorism, under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(C) is
defined as activities that "occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;" while
190
20 St.
191
192
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eral criminal law cover a myriad of different terrorist acts. 19 4 Important components in assessing the viability of indefinite detention within the War on Terror
are criminal procedure, sentencing guidelines and detention practices in comparison to conventional criminal adjudication. Put another way, looking at our current criminal justice system ought to offer a better method to employ in lieu of
indefinite detention.
2.

Addressing Punishment

One way to look at indefinite detention of terrorists in comparison to conventional incarceration practices and length of sentencing in the criminal justice system is to look at the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). Mandatory
minimums and enhancement provisions in subsequent legislation since 2001 increased the overall penalties for terrorism perpetrators and accomplices. This has
been evident in the use of immigration law as both a law enforcement tool and
adjunct to criminal law in the War on Terror. 195 While procedures under the
domestic terrorism, under 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(C) is defined as activities that "occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Regarding the potential of criminal law violation, 18 U.S.C
§ 2331(1) dictates that international terrorism encompasses "activities that ... would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State." This opens up the broad
range of activities that can be construed to seemingly violate U.S. criminal law.
194 The enormous amount of crimes that fall under the 'terrorism' penumbra that transcend national
boundaries includes all of the following under 18 U.S.C § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i): "section 32 (relating to
destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), 37 (relating to violence at international airports), 81 (relating
to arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),
175c (relating to variola virus), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of
section 351 (relating to congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination and kidnapping), 831
(relating to nuclear materials), 832 (relating to participation in nuclear and weapons of mass destruction
threats to the United States) 842(m) or (n) (relating to plastic explosives), 844(f)(2) or (3) (relating to
arson and bombing of Government property risking Or causing death), 844(i) (relating to arson and
bombing of property used in interstate commerce), 930(c) (relating to killing or attempted killing during
an attack on a Federal facility with a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to conspiracy to murder,
kidnap, or maim persons abroad), 1030(a)(1) (relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(A) resulting in damage as defined in 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II) through (VI) (relating to protection of computers), 1114
(relating to killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the United States), 1116 (relating to
murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons), 1203
(relating to hostage taking), 1361 (relating to government property or contracts), 1362 (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property
within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1366(a) (relating to destruction
of an energy facility), 175 1(a), (b), (c), or (d) (relating to Presidential and Presidential staff assassination
and kidnapping), 1992 (relating to terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad carriers and
against mass transportation systems on land, on water, or through the air), 2155 (relating to destruction of
national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2156 (relating to national defense material, premises, or
utilities), 2280 (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 2281 (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332 (relating to certain homicides and other violence against United States nationals occurring outside of the United States), 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass destruction),
2332b (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries), 2332f (relating to bombing of
public places and facilities), 2332g (relating to missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to radiological dispersal devices), 2339 (relating to harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing
material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support to terrorist organizations),
2339C (relating to financing of terrorism), 2339D (relating to military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization), or 2340A (relating to torture) of this title."
195 Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the
"War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061-73 (2002) (discussing immigration law as a tool of the
criminal justice system).
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current indefinite detention protocol call for the re-certification of enemy combatant status every six months by the U.S. Attorney General,1 96 the USSG seemingly offers a more consistent and robust mode of determining sentence
length.19 7 Stringent enhancement levels in sentencing and an upward departure
provision enable the courts to assess what the appropriate punishment should be
according to both enumerated and unenumerated acts of terror. These constructions of domestic terrorism sentencing are promulgated from both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.198
In U.S. v. Meskini, the court held that "the wording of § 3Al.4 could not be
clearer: It directs courts to increase both the offense level and the criminal history
category based on a single crime involving terrorism."' 9 9 The court also held that
so long as Congress has a rational basis for establishing certain penalties, due
process challenges will have no merit. 20 The adherence to federal sentencing
standards will increase the strength of the rule of law.
However, sentencing terrorists has changed significantly since 1996. The
politicization of terrorism may have followed the same trends of the War on
Crime, and the War on Drugs. The decision-making by judges surrounding the
sentencing of terrorists used to be treated as a typical violent-crime, not one
where the political or religious motivations were the primary concern. 20 1 In conventional armed conflicts of an international nature, POW status is given to terrorists solely to prevent them from returning to active hostilities. This is a
preventive measure used to reduce the risks inherent in soldiers returning to their
respective theatres of war. 2 0 2 As mentioned earlier, conduct in war follows the
jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles, and thus conventional use of force in
legitimate warfare is exempt from criminal liability. The War on Terror, despite
its inherent moral and ethical concerns, precludes terrorists from being designated as POWs. Enabling terrorists to return to their respective countries or transferring them to different nations increases the risk of them returning to active
196 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(6) (2001).
197 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs

MANUAL

§

3Al.4 (2014).

198 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Construction andApplication of FederalDomestic Terrorism
Sentencing Enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3AI.4, 186 A.L.R. FED. 147 (2003).
199 United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003).
200 Id. at 91.
201 Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 493-494 (2014) (stating that
prior to the shift in legislation in 1996, "sentencing for crimes involving terrorism was relatively straightforward, since defendants usually faced charges of carrying out violent criminal activity, rendering their
political motivations irrelevant. It followed logically that given the criminal law's capacity for dealing
easily with a violent attack-regardless of what motivated it-the type of sentence courts handed down was
relatively unremarkable. Even where a court pointed out the political context of a given incident, such
details did not affect the nature of the sentence on their own, but the more sensational or violent the
conduct the more severe the resulting sentence.").
202 Walen, supra note 47, at 872-873 (stating "in war, the risks associated with giving members of the
enemy's forces their liberty are large, and therefore prisoners of war ("POWs") can be detained without
having been convicted of a crime.").
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hostilities. This is one of the prime reasons all of aforementioned legislation was
constructed.
While some contend that short-term preventive detention is justified, 203 discerning what constitutes short-term preventive detention for purposes of thwarting terrorist activities is problematic. 204 The aforementioned re-certification
process, which enables unlawful enemy combatants to be held for additional periods of six months, would seemingly be labeled as a long-term preventive strategy. 2 0 5 Nonetheless, determining how to subvert risks posed by terrorism while
maintaining adequate due process measures remains pragmatic in this sense. Universally criminalizing acts of terror under federal domestic law creates consistency in how terrorists are processed, irrespective of their status as aliens or
citizens. Furthermore, dynamic laws, such as those which enhance sentencing
and offender levels, may serve to better marginalize terrorists' ability to escape
certain modes of criminal prosecution. For example, inchoate crimes, such as
threats with intent or conspiracy, or financial crimes associated with terrorism
can either be prosecuted or indefinitely detained under current conditions; the
latter being the subject of controversy. If we were to realign both inchoate and
financial crimes associated with terrorism with current criminal adjudication and
sentencing models, we would not only avert ethical and moral controversy, but
could also serve to delegitimize the acts themselves. Consider the following
passage:
If these people cannot be prosecuted for crimes such as conspiring or
attempting to commit terrorist acts (or ancillary crimes), then they must
be either preventively detained or released and policed. The first of these
options is indefensible in a liberal society; and the latter seems to provide
inadequate security . . . . [However], they can be prosecuted for the ultimate inchoate crime: stating the intention to commit unlawful, violent
acts.
This is not legally controversial, but it is nonetheless philosophically
problematic. The doctrine concerning threat law is a mess, and has failed
to clearly distinguish the crime that concerns causing fear and disruption
from the crime that concerns stating that one has the intention to commit
a particular violent crime. But the distinction can be made and defended.
Forming the intention to commit a criminal act is the essence of inchoate
crimes. And while the crime of stating the intention to commit unlawful,
violent acts pushes the outer limits of the idea of an inchoate crime, it
does not surpass those limits. As long as the crime itself is sufficiently
serious, and the prospects for deterrence sufficiently low, there is reason
203 Id. at 913-16.
204 Id. at 915 ("It is hard to put a number on what would count as 'short-term' detention. Benjamin
Wittes and Colleen Peppard suggest that the executive should have 'broad short-term detention authority'
to detain STs for up to fourteen days, a time they think is sufficient to disrupt terrorist plots.").
205 Alec Walen, CriminalizingStatements of TerroristIntent: How to Understand the Law Governing

TerroristThreats, and Why it Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 807 (2011).
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to have such a crime. Further, those conditions are met when dealing with
politically or religiously motivated terrorist crime. 206
The last part is the most significant declaration on criminalizing terrorism. Our
enhancements and upward departure provisions exemplify how we as a society
view terrorism: a direct threat to liberty. Yet, the incursion of military detention,
rather than conventional incarceration in the criminal justice system, prevents the
criminalization of terrorism. Yes, it is true we tried, convicted and even executed
domestic terrorists like Timothy McVeigh. It is also true that local and federal
law enforcement agencies subdued and circumvented both individual terrorists
and organizations within the United States, all the while prosecuting them in
conventional criminal courts. The argument and scope of this piece is not that we
have shifted all policing and prosecution powers to the military. It is that the
current state of affairs in which we indefinitely incarcerate individuals whose
guilt or innocence has not yet been determined in a court of law is seemingly out
of line in with bringing those responsible of terrorism to justice. This includes
those who planned to commit acts of terror, have done so, or are parties before or
after the fact to terrorism. Using criminal law to undermine terrorist efforts better
addresses the question of how we should combat terrorism, "particularly when
dealing with the threat to commit terrorist acts, with their potentially devastating
results, there is good reason to want the criminal law to step in and prevent the
act from occurring as soon as a culpable act based on that intention has been
performed." 20 7
Have we used all of these tools, or are they still subject to inquiry and theoretical debate? This is the essential question to be answered. According to research,
these enhancements were used 197 times between 1996 and 2012.208 Most of
these did not occur until after Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker
were resolved. 209 Nonetheless, this shift gives sentencing judges even more latitude in adjudicating terrorists, which should be seen as an ability for criminal
courts to impose a sentence that reflects the full nature of the offense. It was
during the 1990's that "the law would shift to allow individuals to be sanctioned
criminally for providing material support to a proscribed foreign terrorist organization where the support was not directly linked to violence of any kind," 2 10 but
it was not for over a decade until the shift ended when courts received more
power to determine what punishments for terrorism could be imposed. While our
criminal court system was capable of handling terrorism as a crime in the wake
206

Id. at 853.

207

Id.
Said, supra note 201, at 502.
209 Id. at 502-03 (explaining the constitutional debate, sparked by both Blakely v. Washington and
Booker v. United States, over imposing sentences that exceeded that maximum threshold under the Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequent cases such as Kimbrough v. United States, Gall v. United States, and Rita
v. United States enabled judges to see sentencing guidelines as 'advisory'. In Kimbrough, the court held
"[t]he Government acknowledges that the Guidelines 'are now advisory' and that, as a general matter,
'courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.").
210 Id. at 498.
208
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of 9/11, shifts in legislation gave increased deference to judicial sentencing practices. Wider definitional scope was created so that terrorism could be fully adjudicated by the criminal justice system. However, this has not come to fruition
despite some positive activity. In the post-Booker world, it seems that trial courts
will rely on appellate courts to determine whether sentences handed down encompass these special enhancements or departures, or whether courts will adhere
to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 in treating terrorists like ordinary violent criminals. 2 1 1
However, in the broader context of treating terrorism as conventional crime,
"harsh sentences seem to be a fair trade-off' given that Congress has dictated a
national policy goal via the enhancement provisions. 2 12
VI.

Conclusion

Why are examinations of the legislative history surrounding the War on Terror, the laws of war and the just war doctrine, application of international law to
domestic courts, and current criminal justice processes important to the debate on
indefinite detention? First, they depict how both sidestep and abide by various
domestic and international legal hurdles. Second, they show where current models originate, and more specifically, how the military justice system and criminal
justice system began to converge, and where global principles and law fit into
each system. Third, while one could examine indefinite detention from a philosophical, namely utilitarian perspective, analyzing the ethical conundrums is not
independent of all of the aforementioned sections. Put another way, to examine
how we adjudicate and combat terrorism in a post-9/11 world, we need to understand our current framework. 2 13 However, it seems that while the military and
criminal justice models each have inadequacies, the traditional military model is
the most problematic due to higher risks of erroneous errors occurring, the indefinite nature of the war itself, and the associational "triggers of detention." 2 14
211 George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, The Sentencing Commission, The Guidelines
and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J.L. & Pul. Pot'y 517, 540 (2014) ("To some extent, judges will look to
appellate courts for answers. The appellate opinions appear to tilt in favor of the enhancement and the
approach it embodies. However, the value of any message that appellate courts might send is inevitably
bound up with broader questions about the sentencing relationship between trial and appellate courts in
the post-Booker era.").
212 Id. at 546.

213 See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1092-1096 (arguing that the three pre-9/11 developments that created the convergence of military detention and criminal justice were: criminal justice preventive methods, the laws of war and human rights, and terrorism and the crime versus war debate.
Collectively, these three developments enabled military detention of terrorists to be seen as viable. The
authors state, "these three pre-9/1 I trends-the rise of prevention in the criminal law system, the importation of human rights law standards into the laws of war, and the growing realization that modem
terrorism warranted military responses based on military authorities-were the seeds of the post-9/11
convergence of the criminal and military detention models."); see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note
5, at 1133 (illustrating a more robust comparison of various models of procedural safeguards, in Appendix A).
214 Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 1100 (concerning how the traditional military model was
perceived to be inadequate following 9/11: "All of these factors make it much more likely that the
traditional military detention process will result in erroneous detentions. The costs of such erroneous
detentions are also higher in this war. The war against al Qaeda and affiliates has an endless quality in the
sense that there is little or no prospect for negotiations leading to an agreed end to hostilities or an

150

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 12, Issue 2

Indefinite Detention in the War on Terror

Nonetheless, while indefinite detention may serve specific short-term goals
within the military model, the use of the criminal justice system afford individuals more robust procedural protections. Specific problems associated with the
legality of such detention under the laws of war and international humanitarian
law can be averted. The criminalization of terrorism is not without its problems.
The largest controversy is the protection of sensitive information that could otherwise be kept from public awareness if terrorists are dealt with in the current
military model. However, while military detention is more flexible than civilian
detention, because of the safeguards it must provide, its usage seemingly undermines the rule of law and our attempt to legitimize a unified and effective stance
against terrorism. Furthermore, this creates pressure on the criminal justice system to 'prove' it can handle prosecuting terrorists. This pressure that might sacrifice integrity in lieu of fairness. 2 15 The "national security interests implicated by
the prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui, indicted as the so-called 'twentieth hijacker,' would not be different were he a citizen." 2 16 The following passage conveniently sums up the viability of adjudicating terrorism through the criminal
justice system. Ressam was an individual caught smuggling weapons into Washington State from the Canadian border in an attempt to set them off at the Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX). The majority held that:
I would suggest that the message to the world from today's sentencing is
that our courts have not abandoned our commitment to the ideals that set
our nation apart. We can deal with the threats to our national security
without denying the accused fundamental constitutional protections.
Despite the fact that Mr. Ressam is not an American citizen and despite
the fact that he entered this country intent upon killing American citizens,
he received an effective, vigorous defense, and the opportunity to have
his guilt or innocence determined by a jury of 12 ordinary citizens. Most
importantly, all of this occurred in the sunlight of a public trial. There
were no secret proceedings, no indefinite detention, no denial of counsel.
The tragedy of September 11th shook our sense of security and made us
realize that we, too, are vulnerable to acts of terrorism. Unfortunately,
some believe that this threat renders our Constitution obsolete. This is a
Constitution for which men and women have died and continue to die and
unconditional surrender. Even if the conflict can be terminated in practical terms through the suppression
or elimination of al Qaeda, moreover, there is reason to believe the conflict could span generations. The
same seemed theoretically possible in the midst of traditional conflicts, of course, but in this war there is
an unusually high risk that preventive detention may prove indefinite.").
215 Jonathan Hafetz, Military Detention in the "War on Terrorism": Normalizing the Exceptional
After 9/11, 112 CoLum. L. REv. SIDEBAR 31, 44-45 ("Conversely, maintaining this alternative military
detention system forces the civilian criminal justice system to demonstrate its capacity to prosecute terrorism cases successfully- with success measured in terms of convictions obtained rather than in the
fairness and integrity of the procedures. This creates pressure to limit criminal defendants' rights-a
trend reflected by recent proposals to expand the 'public safety' exception to Miranda v. Arizona to
deflect criticisms of prosecuting terrorism suspects in federal court.").
216 David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 378 (2003).
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which has made us a model among nations. If that view is allowed to
prevail, the terrorists will have won. 2 17
A few things are of note in this case. First, the individual was known to be a
member of al-Qaeda-which has been the prime focus of much of our legislation.
Second, the incident occurred prior to 9/11. This reflects aforementioned statements about our criminal justice already being capable of processing terrorists
prior to the onslaught of legislation following 9/11. Third, this case poses a significant amount of physical danger due to the intended lethality of his actions.
Nonetheless, our criminal justice system disposed of the individual without
resorting to arbitrary or clandestine means. Thus, terrorism enhancements and the
upward departure provision enacted in the PATRIOT Act ought to further the
strength of courts ability to prosecute terrorists. Utilizing our federal court system
instead of relying on military commissions that are modeled on the laws of war,
international law, and treaties should serve as a symbol that crime is crime, and
should deflect the politicization of terrorism and worldviews. Even if we attempt
to undermine the political nature of terrorism, it still proves difficult because
political motivations may serve as the prime basis of terrorism definitions. 2 18 To
preserve the rule of law and the principles that guided the bulwark of our nation's
due process development, it is essential to uphold democratic safeguards to all
who are subject to punishment in the War on Terror.2 19 We need to divert terrorist proceedings and status determinations to the criminal justice system. This will
ensure that international law and norms are upheld, domestic procedural due process safeguards are met, terrorists receive definitive punishment, and the resolve
of our rule of law goes unfettered.

217 United States v. Ressam, 679 F.3d. 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012).
218 See Marny A. Requa, Considering Just-World Thinking in Counterterrorism Cases: Miscarriages
of Justice in Northern Ireland, 27 HARV. Hum. Rrs. J. 7, 17 (2014) (discussing the attempts of British
leaders to thwart IRA terrorism by undermining their political motivations through 'criminalizing' terrorism; thus depriving it of its weight. However, the author concludes that this is problematic given that
politics lies at the root of the definition of terrorism).
219 Report to the House of Delegates, Am. Bar Ass'n, Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants
(February 10, 2003), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigratedleadership/recommendations03/109.authcheckdam.pdf.
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